

System Study: Residual Heat Removal 1998–2018

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**System Study:
Residual Heat Removal
1998–2018**

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ABSTRACT

This report presents an unreliability evaluation of the residual heat removal (RHR) system in two modes of operation (low-pressure injection in response to a large loss-of-coolant accident and post-trip shutdown-cooling) at 104 U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. Demand, run hours, and failure data from calendar years 1998 through 2018 for selected components were obtained from the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Industry Reporting and Information System (IRIS), formerly the INPO Consolidated Events Database (ICES). The unreliability results are trended for the most recent 10-year period while yearly estimates for system unreliability are provided for the entire active period. No statistically significant increasing or decreasing trends were identified in the RHR results.

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ACRONYMS

AOV	air-operated valve
BW	Babcock and Wilcox
BWR	boiling water reactor
CCF	common-cause failure
CE	Combustion Engineering
DHR	decay heat removal
FTOC	fail to open/close
FTOP	fail to operate
FTR	fail to run
FTR>1H	fail to run more than one hour (standby)
FTR<1H	fail to run less than one hour (after start)
FTS	fail to start
GE	General Electric
GTG	gas turbine generator
HPCI	high-pressure coolant injection
HTG	hydro turbine generator
HTX	heat exchanger
ICES	INPO Consolidated Events Database
INPO	Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
IRIS	Industry Reporting and Information System
LOHT	loss of heat transfer
LLOCA	large loss-of-coolant accident
LPI	low-pressure injection
MDP	motor-driven pump
MOV	motor-operated valve
MSPI	Mitigating Systems Performance Index
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PRA	probabilistic risk assessment
RCS	reactor coolant system
RHR	residual heat removal
ROP	Reactor Oversight Process
SDC	shutdown-cooling
SO	spurious operation
SPAR	standardized plant analysis risk
SPC	suppression pool cooling
SSU	safety system unavailability

UA unavailability (maintenance or state of another component)
WE Westinghouse Electric

System Study: Residual Heat Removal 1998–2018

1. INTRODUCTION

The residual heat removal (RHR) system is typically a multiple use system with modes of operation for low-pressure injection (LPI), shutdown cooling (SDC), suppression pool or containment sump cooling, and/or containment spray. Some plants have dedicated systems to accomplish one or more of these modes. This report presents an unreliability evaluation over time of the RHR system in two modes of operation—LPI in response to a large loss-of-coolant accident (LLOCA) and post-trip SDC—at 104 U.S. commercial nuclear power plants.

Demand, run hours, and failure data from calendar year 1998 through 2018 for selected components in the RHR system were obtained from the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Industry Reporting and Information System (IRIS), formerly the INPO Consolidated Events Database (ICES) and the Equipment Performance and Information Exchange Database (EPIX). Train unavailability data (outages from test or maintenance) were obtained from the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) Safety System Unavailability (SSU) database (1998 through 2001) and the Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI) database (2002 through 2018). Common-cause failure (CCF) data used in the models are from the 2010 update to the CCF database. The system unreliability results are trended for the most recent 10-year period while yearly estimates for system unreliability are provided for the entire active period.

This report does not attempt to estimate basic event values for use in a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). Suggested values for such use are presented in the 2015 Component Reliability Update [1], which is an update to NUREG/CR-6928 [2] and the 2010 Component Reliability Update [3]. Baseline RHR unreliability results using basic event values from the 2010 Component Reliability Update^a are summarized in Section 3. Trend results for RHR (using system-specific data) are presented in Section 4. Similar to previous system study updates, Section 5 contains importance information (using the baseline results from Section 3), and Section 1 describes the RHR system.

All models include failures due to unavailability while in test or maintenance. Human error has not been included in the SPAR model logic. Human actions and recovery events in the models are set to False in the study for the results to represent the mechanical part of the system. An overview of the trending methods, glossary of terms, and abbreviations can be found in the paper Overview and Reference [4] on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Reactor Operational Experience Results and Databases web page (<https://nrcoe.inl.gov/resultsdb/>).

1.1 Low-Pressure Injection Mode

Table 1 shows the definitions of the design classes used in the LPI mode of operation sections of this report. For each plant, the corresponding SPAR model (version model indicated in Table 3 was used in

^a For comparison purposes, in order to keep the SPAR models and basic event data the same as those used in the previous (2016) RHR system study, the 2010 Component Reliability Update data is used here. The only variables subject to change in this analysis were the demand, run hours, failure, and unavailability data for selected components in the RHR system.

the calculations. The LPI mode represents the use of the system as it is normally lined up during power operations. The RHR system in LPI mode is an automatically initiated event.

The RHR system is categorized by the number of redundant LPI pumps and the plant vendor design. Table 3 summarizes the plants and their LPI classes.

Two versions of the LPI mode models for the RHR system are calculated. The RHR start-only model is the SPAR RHR LPI mode model modified by setting all fail-to-run basic events to zero (False), setting all human error and recovery events to False, all room cooling events to False, and all pump cooling events to False. The 8-hour mission model includes all basic events in the SPAR RHR LPI mode model while sets all human error and recovery events to False.

Table 1. RHR low-pressure injection class definitions.

RHR Injection Class	Description	Number of Plants
2 pumps; BW	Two RHR pump Babcock and Wilcox (BW) Design	4
2 pumps; CE	Two RHR pump Combustion Engineering (CE) Design	11
2 pumps; GE	Two RHR pump General Electric (GE) Design	9
2 pumps; WE	Two RHR pump Westinghouse (WE) Design	46
3 pumps; BW	Three RHR pump Babcock and Wilcox Design	3
3 pumps; GE	Three RHR pump General Electric Design	4
3 pumps; WE	Three RHR pump Westinghouse Design	2
4 pumps; CE	Four RHR pump Combustion Engineering Design	3
4 pumps; GE	Four RHR pump General Electric Design	22
Total		104

1.2 Shutdown Cooling Mode

Table 2 shows the definitions of the design classes used in the SDC mode of operation sections of this report. For each plant the corresponding Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model (version model indicated in Table 3) was used in the calculations.

The SDC mode represents the most challenging (more risk-significant at PWRs than in BWRs) use of the equipment since the heat exchangers are required to function and valves must be repositioned to initiate the cooldown function. The RHR system in SDC mode is a manually initiated event. Each fault tree modeling the SDC mode of RHR includes a human action basic event to model the initiation. This basic event always comes out as the most important basic event in the model. To evaluate the system in more detail, the human action to initiate SDC was set to False in the fault tree.

The RHR SDC mode is categorized by the heat sink method in this report as the most significant difference noted between systems at plants. The direct heat sink takes sensible heat from the reactor coolant system (RCS) and transfers it directly to the ultimate heat sink (a variation of a service water system either dedicated or shared with other safety systems). The indirect heat sink transfers sensible heat to a closed cooling water system, which in turn transfers the heat to the ultimate heat sink. Table 3 summarizes the plants and their classes.

Two variations of the SDC modes for the RHR system are calculated. The RHR start-only variation is the SPAR RHR SDC model modified by setting all fail-to-run basic events to zero (False), setting all

human error and recovery events to False, all room cooling events to False, and all pump cooling events to False. The 24-hour mission variation includes all basic events in the SPAR RHR SDC model while sets all human error and recovery events to False.

Table 2. RHR shutdown cooling mode design class definitions.

RHR Shutdown Cooling Design Class	Description	Number of Plants
Direct-Multiple	Direct heat sink, uses multiple suction paths	5
Direct-Single	Direct heat sink, uses a single suction path	29
Indirect-Multiple	Indirect heat sink, uses multiple suction paths	24
Indirect-Single	Indirect heat sink, uses a single suction path	31
No suction modeled	Models do not include the suction path valves (model suppression pool cooling only)	4
Single Train	Only one train is used in the model	1
Single Use	Plants with a single-use SDC system	10
Total		104

Table 3. RHR design class summary.

Plant	Version	Injection Class	Shutdown Cooling Class	Plant	Version	Injection Class	Shutdown Cooling Class
Arkansas 1	8.19	2 pumps; BW	Direct-Single	Indian Point 3	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single
Arkansas 2	8.21	2 pumps; CE	Direct-Single	Kewaunee	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple
Beaver Valley 1	8.22	2 pumps; WE	Single Use	La Salle 1	8.21	2 pumps; GE	Direct-Single
Beaver Valley 2	8.23	2 pumps; WE	Single Use	La Salle 2	8.21	2 pumps; GE	Direct-Single
Braidwood 1	8.21	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple	Limerick 1	8.20	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single
Braidwood 2	8.21	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple	Limerick 2	8.19	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single
Browns Ferry 1	8.22	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	McGuire 1	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single
Browns Ferry 2	8.22	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	McGuire 2	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single
Browns Ferry 3	8.18	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	Millstone 2	8.17	2 pumps; CE	Indirect-Single
Brunswick 1	8.20	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	Millstone 3	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple
Brunswick 2	8.20	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	Monticello	8.20	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single
Byron 1	8.21	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple	Nine Mile Pt. 1	8.21	3 pumps; GE	Single Use
Byron 2	8.21	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple	Nine Mile Pt. 2	8.17	2 pumps; GE	Direct-Single
Callaway	8.21	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple	North Anna 1	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Single Use
Calvert Cliffs 1	8.22	2 pumps; CE	Indirect-Single	North Anna 2	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Single Use
Calvert Cliffs 2	8.21	2 pumps; CE	Indirect-Single	Oconee 1	8.19	3 pumps; BW	Indirect-Single
Catawba 1	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single	Oconee 2	8.19	3 pumps; BW	Indirect-Single
Catawba 2	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single	Oconee 3	8.19	3 pumps; BW	Indirect-Single
Clinton 1	8.17	2 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	Oyster Creek	8.22	3 pumps; GE	Single Use
Columbia 2	8.16	2 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	Palisades	8.20	2 pumps; CE	Indirect-Single
Comanche Peak 1	8.21	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple	Palo Verde 1	8.20	4 pumps; CE	Direct-Multiple
Comanche Peak 2	8.21	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple	Palo Verde 2	8.20	4 pumps; CE	Direct-Multiple
Cook 1	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single	Palo Verde 3	8.20	4 pumps; CE	Direct-Multiple
Cook 2	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single	Peach Bottom 2	8.25	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single
Cooper	8.22	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	Peach Bottom 3	8.21	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single
Crystal River 3	8.16	2 pumps; BW	Direct-Single	Perry	8.19	2 pumps; GE	Indirect-Single
Davis-Besse	8.19	2 pumps; BW	Indirect-Single	Pilgrim	8.21	4 pumps; GE	No suction modeled
Diablo Canyon 1	8.19	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single	Point Beach 1	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single
Diablo Canyon 2	8.19	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single	Point Beach 2	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single
Dresden 2	8.18	3 pumps; GE	Single Use	Prairie Island 1	8.19	2 pumps; WE	Direct-Multiple
Dresden 3	8.18	3 pumps; GE	Single Use	Prairie Island 2	8.19	2 pumps; WE	Direct-Multiple
Duane Arnold	8.22	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	Quad Cities 1	8.18	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single
Farley 1	8.18	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple	Quad Cities 2	8.18	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single
Farley 2	8.18	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple	River Bend	8.20	2 pumps; GE	Direct-Single
Fermi 2	8.20	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	Robinson 2	8.17	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single
FitzPatrick	8.17	4 pumps; GE	No suction modeled	Salem 1	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single
Fort Calhoun	8.20	2 pumps; CE	Indirect-Single	Salem 2	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single
Ginna	8.23	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single	San Onofre 2	8.22	2 pumps; CE	Indirect-Multiple
Grand Gulf	8.22	2 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	San Onofre 3	8.22	2 pumps; CE	Indirect-Multiple
Harris	8.23	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple	Seabrook	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple
Hatch 1	8.20	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	Sequoyah 1	8.16	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single
Hatch 2	8.20	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	Sequoyah 2	8.16	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single
Hope Creek	8.18	2 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	South Texas 1	8.17	3 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple
Indian Point 2	8.19	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single	South Texas 2	8.17	3 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple

Table 3. (continued).

Plant	Version	Injection Class	Shutdown Cooling Class	Plant	Version	Injection Class	Shutdown Cooling Class
St. Lucie 1	8.19	2 pumps; CE	Indirect-Multiple	Turkey Point 3	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single
St. Lucie 2	8.19	2 pumps; CE	Indirect-Multiple	Turkey Point 4	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single
Summer	8.23	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple	Vermont Yankee	8.19	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single
Surry 1	8.19	2 pumps; WE	Single Use	Vogtle 1	8.21	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple
Surry 2	8.15	2 pumps; WE	Single Use	Vogtle 2	8.21	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple
Susquehanna 1	8.23	4 pumps; GE	No suction modeled	Waterford 3	8.16	2 pumps; CE	Indirect-Multiple
Susquehanna 2	8.21	4 pumps; GE	No suction modeled	Watts Bar 1	8.16	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single
Three Mile Isl 1	8.20	2 pumps; BW	Single Train	Wolf Creek	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple

2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The results of this RHR system unreliability study are summarized in this section. Of particular interest is the existence of any statistically significant^a increasing trends. In this update, **no statistically significant increasing or decreasing trends were identified** in the RHR unreliability trend results.

The industry-wide RHR **LPI mode** start-only and 8-hour basic event group importances were evaluated and are shown in Figure 9:

- In the **Start-Only** case—the leading contributor to RHR system LPI mode unreliability is the **RHR MDP** (motor-driven pump) group of basic events followed by the Injection and Special groups.
- In the **8-Hour** case—the leading contributor to RHR system LPI mode unreliability is also the **RHR MDP** group of basic events followed by the Injection and Special groups.

The industry-wide RHR **SDC mode** start-only and 24-hour basic event group importances were evaluated and are shown in Figure 19:

- In the **Start-Only** case—the leading contributor to RHR system SDC mode unreliability is the **Injection** group of basic events followed by the Suction and RHR MDP groups.
- In the **24-Hour** case—the leading contributor to RHR system SDC mode unreliability is also the **Injection** group of basic events followed by the Suction and RHR MDP groups.

For those plants with a single suction source, the suction segment importance increases significantly. For those plants that have multiple suction sources, the pump importance increases since the suction segment importance decreases (see Figure 20 vs. Figure 21). The distinction between the heat sink types (direct versus indirect) is not very large (see Figure 20 vs. Figure 22). This is due to the standby nature of most of the direct heat sink systems and the normally operating nature of the indirect heat sink systems.

a. Statistically significant is defined in terms of the ‘p-value.’ A p-value is a probability indicating whether to accept or reject the null hypothesis that there is no trend in the data. P-values of less than or equal to 0.05 indicate that we are 95% confident that there is a trend in the data (reject the null hypothesis of no trend.) By convention, we use the "Michelin Guide" scale: p-value < 0.05 (statistically significant), p-value < 0.01 (highly statistically significant); p-value < 0.001 (extremely statistically significant).

3. INDUSTRY-WIDE UNRELIABILITY

3.1 Low-Pressure Injection Mode

The RHR LPI mode fault trees (not all SPAR models label the appropriate fault tree as ‘LPI’, Table 14 lists the fault tree that was evaluated for this report) from the SPAR models were evaluated for each of the 104 operating U.S. commercial pressurized water nuclear power plants with an RHR system.

The industry-wide unreliability of the RHR system has been estimated for two modes of operation. A start-only model and an 8-hour mission model were evaluated. The uncertainty distributions for RHR show both plant design variability and parameter uncertainty while using industry-wide component failure data (1998 through 2010).^a Table 4 shows the percentiles and mean of the aggregated sample data (Latin hypercube, 1000 samples for each model) collected from the uncertainty calculations of the RHR fault trees in the SPAR models. In Figure 1 and Figure 2, the 5th and 95th percentiles and mean point estimates are shown for each RHR class and for the industry.

In Figure 1 and Figure 2, the width of the distribution for a class is affected by the differences in the plant modeling and the parameter uncertainty used in the models. Because the width is affected by the plant modeling, the width is also affected by the number of unique plant models in a class. For those classes with very few plants that share a design, the width can be very small.

Table 4. Industry-wide low-pressure injection mode unreliability values.

Model	RHR Grouping	Lower (5%)	Median	Mean	Upper (95%)
Start-only	Industry	9.11E-06	9.48E-05	5.64E-04	3.01E-03
	2 pumps; BW	8.82E-05	3.45E-04	5.78E-04	1.75E-03
	2 pumps; CE	3.59E-05	2.82E-04	2.13E-03	7.56E-03
	2 pumps; GE	1.93E-06	3.72E-05	3.97E-04	1.90E-03
	2 pumps; WE	1.82E-05	7.91E-05	2.39E-04	9.51E-04
	3 pumps; BW	3.54E-05	2.12E-04	4.01E-04	1.38E-03
	3 pumps; GE	4.32E-07	1.51E-04	7.39E-04	3.13E-03
	3 pumps; WE	5.35E-06	1.49E-05	2.01E-05	4.18E-05
	4 pumps; CE	3.58E-05	1.36E-04	2.14E-04	6.71E-04
	4 pumps; GE	9.10E-06	6.72E-05	3.65E-04	1.25E-03
8-hour Mission	Industry	1.15E-05	1.04E-04	5.79E-04	3.04E-03
	2 pumps; BW	9.70E-05	3.54E-04	5.89E-04	1.75E-03
	2 pumps; CE	4.23E-05	2.97E-04	2.14E-03	7.61E-03
	2 pumps; GE	5.96E-06	3.89E-05	4.02E-04	1.91E-03
	2 pumps; WE	2.42E-05	8.83E-05	2.49E-04	9.54E-04
	3 pumps; BW	3.51E-05	2.11E-04	4.08E-04	1.38E-03
	3 pumps; GE	4.32E-07	1.51E-04	7.38E-04	3.14E-03
	3 pumps; WE	6.98E-06	1.68E-05	2.19E-05	4.48E-05
	4 pumps; CE	7.56E-05	2.96E-04	8.76E-04	1.50E-03
	4 pumps; GE	9.72E-06	6.75E-05	3.65E-04	1.26E-03

a. In using industry-wide component failure data, individual plant-specific performance does not appear in the distribution of results.




Figure 1. RHR low-pressure injection mode start-only mission unreliability for class and industry-wide groupings.




Figure 2. RHR low-pressure injection mode 8-hour mission unreliability for class and industry-wide groupings.

3.2 Shutdown Cooling Mode

The RHR SDC mode fault trees (not all SPAR models label the appropriate fault tree as ‘RHR’, Table 14 lists the fault tree that was evaluated for this report) from the SPAR models were evaluated for each of the 104 operating U.S. commercial pressurized water nuclear power plants with an RHR system.

The industry-wide unreliability of the RHR system has been estimated for two modes of operation. A start-only model and a 24-hour mission model were evaluated. The uncertainty distributions for RHR show both plant design variability and parameter uncertainty while using industry-wide component failure data (1998 through 2010).^a Table 5 shows the percentiles and mean of the aggregated sample data (Latin hypercube, 1000 samples for each model) collected from the uncertainty calculations of the RHR fault trees in the SPAR models. In Figure 3 and Figure 4, the 5th and 95th percentiles and mean point estimates are shown for each RHR class and for the industry.

In Figure 3 and Figure 4, the width of the distribution for a class is affected by the differences in the plant modeling and the parameter uncertainty used in the models. Because the width is affected by the plant modeling, the width is also affected by the number of different plant models in a class. For those classes with very few plants that share a design, the width can be very small.

Table 5. Industry-wide shutdown cooling mode unreliability values.

Model	RHR Grouping	Lower (5%)	Median	Mean	Upper (95%)
Start-only	Industry	5.44E-05	2.13E-03	3.96E-03	1.50E-02
	Direct-Multiple	4.56E-04	1.59E-03	2.00E-03	4.97E-03
	Direct-Single	9.61E-05	1.99E-03	2.77E-03	8.75E-03
	Indirect-Multiple	5.74E-05	6.34E-04	2.85E-03	1.18E-02
	Indirect-Single	8.13E-04	3.31E-03	5.16E-03	1.57E-02
	No suction modeled	8.25E-06	4.39E-05	8.93E-05	2.96E-04
	Single Train	9.95E-03	1.82E-02	1.94E-02	3.46E-02
	Single Use	1.39E-04	4.35E-03	7.36E-03	2.47E-02
24-hour Mission	Industry	6.01E-05	2.15E-03	4.03E-03	1.54E-02
	Direct-Multiple	4.88E-04	1.73E-03	2.50E-03	5.93E-03
	Direct-Single	9.62E-05	2.00E-03	2.78E-03	8.83E-03
	Indirect-Multiple	7.16E-05	6.57E-04	2.87E-03	1.17E-02
	Indirect-Single	8.35E-04	3.32E-03	5.17E-03	1.58E-02
	No suction modeled	9.21E-06	4.47E-05	8.97E-05	3.11E-04
	Single Train	1.03E-02	1.85E-02	1.97E-02	3.49E-02
	Single Use	1.56E-04	4.48E-03	7.74E-03	2.61E-02

^a By using industry-wide component failure data, individual plant performance is not included in the distribution of results.




Figure 3. RHR shutdown cooling mode start-only mission unreliability for class and industry-wide groupings.




Figure 4. RHR shutdown cooling mode 24-hour mission unreliability for class and industry-wide groupings.

4. INDUSTRY-WIDE TRENDS

The yearly (1998 through 2018) failure and demand or run time data were obtained from ICES for the RHR system. RHR train maintenance unavailability data for trending are from the same time period, as reported in the ROP program and ICES. The component basic event uncertainty was calculated for the RHR system components using the trending methods described in Section 1 and 2 of the Overview and Reference document [4]. These data were loaded into the RHR system fault tree in each SPAR model (see Table 3).

The trend charts show the results of varying component reliability data over time and updating generic, relatively flat prior distributions (or constrained noninformative distributions, refer to Section 2 of the Overview and Reference document) using data for each year. In addition, the calculated industry-wide system reliability from this update is shown. Section 4 of the Overview and Reference document provides more detailed discussion of the trending methods. In the lower left-hand corner of the trend figures, the regression method is reported.

4.1 Low-Pressure Injection Mode

The components that were varied in the RHR (LPI mode) model are

- RHR MDP start, run, and test and maintenance
- RHR heat exchanger heat transfer and test and maintenance
- Suction and Injection valves fail-to-open or close.

Figure 5 shows the trend in the RHR (LPI mode) start-only model unreliability. Table 7 shows the data points for Figure 5. **No statistically significant trend was identified** within the industry-wide estimates of RHR (LPI mode) system start-only mission.

Figure 6 shows the trend in the 8-hour mission unreliability. Table 8 shows the data points for Figure 6. **No statistically significant trend was identified** within the industry-wide estimate of RHR (LPI mode) system unreliability (8-hour mission) was identified.




Figure 5. Trend of RHR low-pressure injection mode system unreliability (start-only model).




Figure 6. Trend of RHR low-pressure injection mode system unreliability (8-hour model).

4.2 Shutdown Cooling Mode

The components that were varied in the RHR (SDC mode) model are:

- RHR motor-driven pump start, run, and test and maintenance.
- RHR heat exchanger heat transfer and test and maintenance.
- Suction and Injection valves fail-to-open or close.

Figure 7 shows the trend in the RHR (SDC mode) start-only model unreliability. Table 9 shows the data points for Figure 7. **No statistically significant trend was identified** within the industry-wide estimates of RHR (SDC mode) system start-only mission on a per year basis.

Figure 8 shows the trend in the RHR (SDC mode) 24-hour mission unreliability. Table 10 shows the data points for Figure 8. **No statistically significant trend was identified** within the industry-wide estimates of RHR (SDC mode) system unreliability (24-hour mission) on a per year basis.




Figure 7. Trend of RHR shutdown cooling mode system unreliability (start-only model).




Figure 8. Trend of RHR shutdown cooling mode system unreliability (24-hour model).

5. BASIC EVENT GROUP IMPORTANCES

The RHR basic event group Fussell-Vesely importances were calculated for each plant using the industry-wide data (1998–2010). These basic event group importances were then averaged across all plants to represent an industry-wide basic event group importance. Table 6 shows the SPAR model RHR importance groups and their descriptions.

Table 6. RHR model basic event importance group descriptions.

Group	Description
AC Power	The ac buses and circuit breakers that supply power to the RHR pumps.
CCW	Closed cooling water system. An intermediate cooling system that transfers the heat to the ultimate heat sink.
DC Power	The batteries and battery chargers that supply power to the pump control circuitry.
EPS	RHR dependency on the emergency power system.
HA Start RHR	Human action to start the pumps and re-align any valves.
Heat Sink	The pumps, valves, strainers and other equipment associated with the ultimate heat sink.
Injection	The flow path equipment, to direct the shutdown cooling water to the RCS loop.
Instrument Air	Instrument air support to the RHR model.
Min Flow	The minimum flow valves around the RHR heat exchangers. These are used to control the cooldown rate.
Pump Cooling	Cooling provided to the shutdown cooling pumps.
RHR HTX	The first heat exchanger in the system to transfer heat from the RCS to the next level of heat removal.
RHR MDP	The motor-driven pumps that provide the recirculation flow from the RCS loop back to the RCS.
Room Cooling	Cooling provided to the room the shutdown cooling pumps are located in.
Special	Various events used in the models that are not directly associated with the RHR system.
Suction	Valves in the suction section of the shutdown cooling system. These valves are required to change position to redirect the suction to the RCS loop.

5.1 Low-Pressure Injection Mode

The industry-wide RHR start-only and 8-hour basic event group importances for LPI mode are shown in Figure 9:

- In the **Start-Only** case—the leading contributor to RHR system LPI mode unreliability is the **RHR MDP** group of basic events followed by the Injection and Special groups.
- In the **8-Hour** case—the leading contributor to RHR system LPI mode unreliability is also the **RHR MDP** group of basic events followed by the Injection and Special groups.

For more discussion on the RHR MDPs and the RHR motor-operated and air-operated valves (MOVs and AOVs), see the component reliability studies at the NRC Reactor Operational Experience Results and Databases web page (<https://nrcOE.inl.gov/resultsdb/>).

The basic event group importances were also averaged across plants of the same RHR class to represent class basic event group importances. The RHR class-specific start-only and 8-hour basic event group importances for LPI mode are shown in Figure 10 to Figure 18.




Figure 9. RHR low-pressure injection mode industry-wide basic event group importances.




Figure 10. RHR low-pressure injection mode two pump BW basic event group importances.




Figure 11. RHR low-pressure injection mode two pumps CE basic event group importances.




Figure 12. RHR low-pressure injection mode two pumps GE basic event group importances.




Figure 13. RHR low-pressure injection mode two pumps WE basic event group importances.




Figure 14. RHR low-pressure injection mode three pumps BW basic event group importances.




Figure 15. RHR low-pressure injection mode three pumps GE basic event group importances.




Figure 16. RHR low-pressure injection mode three pumps WE basic event group importances.




Figure 17. RHR low-pressure injection mode four pumps CE basic event group importances.




Figure 18. RHR low-pressure injection mode four pumps GE basic event group importances.

5.2 Shutdown Cooling Mode

The industry-wide RHR start-only and 24-hour basic event group importances for SDC mode are shown in Figure 19:

- In the **Start-Only** case—the leading contributor to RHR system SDC mode unreliability is the **Injection** group of basic events followed by the Suction and RHR MDP groups.
- In the **24-Hour** case—the leading contributor to RHR system SDC mode unreliability is also the **Injection** group of basic events followed by the Suction and RHR MDP groups.

For more discussion on the RHR MOVs and AOVs, see the MOV and AOV component reliability studies at the NRC Reactor Operational Experience Results and Databases web page (<https://nrcOE.inl.gov/resultsdb/>).

The basic event group importances were also averaged across plants of the same RHR class to represent class basic event group importances. The RHR class-specific start-only and 24-hour basic event group importances for SDC mode are shown in Figure 20 to Figure 26.

For those plants with a single suction source, the suction segment importance increases significantly. For those plants that have multiple suction sources, the pump importance increases since the suction segment importance decreases (see Figure 20 vs. Figure 21). The distinction between the heat sink types (direct versus indirect) is not very large (see Figure 20 vs. Figure 22). This is due to the standby nature of most of the direct heat sink systems and the normally operating nature of the indirect heat sink systems.




Figure 19. RHR shutdown cooling mode industry-wide basic event group importances.




Figure 20. RHR shutdown cooling mode direct heat sink, multiple suction path basic event group importances.




Figure 21. RHR shutdown cooling mode direct heat sink, single suction path basic event group importances.




Figure 22. RHR shutdown cooling mode indirect heat sink, multiple suction paths basic event group importances.




Figure 23. RHR shutdown cooling mode indirect heat sink, single suction path basic event group importances.




Figure 24. RHR shutdown cooling mode no suction modeled basic event group importances.




Figure 25. RHR shutdown cooling mode single train basic event group importances.




Figure 26. RHR shutdown cooling mode single use SDC system basic event group importances.

6. DATA TABLES

Table 7. Plot data for RHR low-pressure injection mode start-only trend, Figure 5.

Year/Source	Regression Curve Data Points			Annual Estimate Data Points		
	Lower (5%)	Mean	Upper (95%)	Lower (5%)	Mean	Upper (95%)
SPAR/ICES	--	--	--	9.11E-06	5.64E-04	3.01E-03
1998	--	--	--	1.27E-05	5.71E-04	3.02E-03
1999	--	--	--	8.81E-06	5.50E-04	2.98E-03
2000	--	--	--	1.29E-05	5.73E-04	3.02E-03
2001	--	--	--	9.31E-06	5.62E-04	2.99E-03
2002	--	--	--	9.40E-06	5.52E-04	2.98E-03
2003	--	--	--	1.02E-05	5.55E-04	2.98E-03
2004	--	--	--	1.03E-05	5.55E-04	2.98E-03
2005	--	--	--	1.25E-05	5.69E-04	3.01E-03
2006	--	--	--	1.28E-05	5.75E-04	3.02E-03
2007	--	--	--	1.28E-05	5.73E-04	3.02E-03
2008	--	--	--	9.52E-06	5.54E-04	2.98E-03
2009	5.38E-04	5.50E-04	5.62E-04	9.01E-06	5.58E-04	3.00E-03
2010	5.40E-04	5.50E-04	5.60E-04	1.08E-05	5.59E-04	2.99E-03
2011	5.42E-04	5.51E-04	5.59E-04	6.66E-06	5.37E-04	2.95E-03
2012	5.44E-04	5.51E-04	5.58E-04	9.77E-06	5.54E-04	2.98E-03
2013	5.45E-04	5.51E-04	5.58E-04	6.65E-06	5.38E-04	2.96E-03
2014	5.45E-04	5.52E-04	5.58E-04	7.41E-06	5.43E-04	2.96E-03
2015	5.45E-04	5.52E-04	5.59E-04	1.01E-05	5.60E-04	2.99E-03
2016	5.44E-04	5.52E-04	5.61E-04	9.55E-06	5.52E-04	2.97E-03
2017	5.43E-04	5.53E-04	5.63E-04	1.00E-05	5.56E-04	2.99E-03
2018	5.42E-04	5.53E-04	5.65E-04	9.14E-06	5.57E-04	2.98E-03

Table 8. Plot data for RHR low-pressure injection mode 8-hour trend, Figure 6.

Year/Source	Regression Curve Data Points			Annual Estimate Data Points		
	Lower (5%)	Mean	Upper (95%)	Lower (5%)	Mean	Upper (95%)
SPAR/ICES	--	--	--	1.15E-05	5.79E-04	3.04E-03
1998	--	--	--	1.51E-05	5.88E-04	3.05E-03
1999	--	--	--	1.10E-05	5.66E-04	3.01E-03
2000	--	--	--	1.54E-05	5.90E-04	3.05E-03
2001	--	--	--	1.15E-05	5.78E-04	3.01E-03
2002	--	--	--	1.14E-05	5.68E-04	3.01E-03
2003	--	--	--	1.23E-05	5.71E-04	3.01E-03
2004	--	--	--	1.24E-05	5.71E-04	3.01E-03
2005	--	--	--	1.49E-05	5.86E-04	3.05E-03
2006	--	--	--	1.53E-05	5.91E-04	3.08E-03
2007	--	--	--	1.53E-05	5.89E-04	3.06E-03
2008	--	--	--	1.16E-05	5.69E-04	3.01E-03
2009	5.54E-04	5.66E-04	5.78E-04	1.17E-05	5.74E-04	3.04E-03
2010	5.56E-04	5.66E-04	5.76E-04	1.31E-05	5.75E-04	3.03E-03
2011	5.58E-04	5.66E-04	5.75E-04	8.67E-06	5.53E-04	2.99E-03
2012	5.60E-04	5.67E-04	5.74E-04	1.20E-05	5.70E-04	3.02E-03
2013	5.61E-04	5.67E-04	5.74E-04	8.69E-06	5.53E-04	2.99E-03
2014	5.61E-04	5.68E-04	5.74E-04	9.56E-06	5.59E-04	2.99E-03
2015	5.61E-04	5.68E-04	5.75E-04	1.24E-05	5.77E-04	3.02E-03
2016	5.60E-04	5.69E-04	5.77E-04	1.16E-05	5.68E-04	3.01E-03
2017	5.59E-04	5.69E-04	5.79E-04	1.22E-05	5.72E-04	3.02E-03
2018	5.57E-04	5.69E-04	5.82E-04	1.12E-05	5.73E-04	3.01E-03

Table 9. Plot data for RHR shutdown cooling mode start-only trend, Figure 7.

Year/Source	Regression Curve Data Points			Annual Estimate Data Points		
	Lower (5%)	Mean	Upper (95%)	Lower (5%)	Mean	Upper (95%)
SPAR/ICES	--	--	--	5.44E-05	3.96E-03	1.50E-02
1998	--	--	--	6.26E-05	4.23E-03	1.58E-02
1999	--	--	--	4.80E-05	3.71E-03	1.42E-02
2000	--	--	--	6.14E-05	4.08E-03	1.56E-02
2001	--	--	--	4.40E-05	2.87E-03	1.33E-02
2002	--	--	--	4.80E-05	3.69E-03	1.42E-02
2003	--	--	--	4.92E-05	3.51E-03	1.42E-02
2004	--	--	--	5.02E-05	3.57E-03	1.43E-02
2005	--	--	--	6.43E-05	4.37E-03	1.60E-02
2006	--	--	--	7.32E-05	5.16E-03	1.71E-02
2007	--	--	--	6.76E-05	4.65E-03	1.64E-02
2008	--	--	--	4.88E-05	3.73E-03	1.43E-02
2009	3.36E-03	3.90E-03	4.54E-03	6.38E-05	4.70E-03	1.59E-02
2010	3.35E-03	3.81E-03	4.33E-03	5.49E-05	3.90E-03	1.50E-02
2011	3.34E-03	3.72E-03	4.14E-03	3.80E-05	3.09E-03	1.32E-02
2012	3.31E-03	3.63E-03	3.98E-03	5.08E-05	3.72E-03	1.45E-02
2013	3.26E-03	3.54E-03	3.84E-03	3.81E-05	3.10E-03	1.32E-02
2014	3.18E-03	3.45E-03	3.75E-03	4.29E-05	3.39E-03	1.37E-02
2015	3.07E-03	3.37E-03	3.69E-03	4.71E-05	3.22E-03	1.38E-02
2016	2.95E-03	3.29E-03	3.66E-03	4.61E-05	3.32E-03	1.38E-02
2017	2.82E-03	3.21E-03	3.65E-03	5.16E-05	3.75E-03	1.46E-02
2018	2.69E-03	3.13E-03	3.64E-03	4.38E-05	3.08E-03	1.34E-02

Table 10. Plot data for RHR shutdown cooling mode 24-hour trend, Figure 8.

Year/Source	Regression Curve Data Points			Annual Estimate Data Points		
	Lower (5%)	Mean	Upper (95%)	Lower (5%)	Mean	Upper (95%)
SPAR/ICES	--	--	--	6.01E-05	4.03E-03	1.54E-02
1998	--	--	--	6.89E-05	4.30E-03	1.62E-02
1999	--	--	--	5.45E-05	3.77E-03	1.46E-02
2000	--	--	--	6.75E-05	4.14E-03	1.61E-02
2001	--	--	--	4.96E-05	2.93E-03	1.38E-02
2002	--	--	--	5.43E-05	3.76E-03	1.46E-02
2003	--	--	--	5.57E-05	3.58E-03	1.46E-02
2004	--	--	--	5.65E-05	3.64E-03	1.48E-02
2005	--	--	--	7.07E-05	4.44E-03	1.64E-02
2006	--	--	--	7.90E-05	5.23E-03	1.75E-02
2007	--	--	--	7.35E-05	4.72E-03	1.68E-02
2008	--	--	--	5.53E-05	3.80E-03	1.47E-02
2009	3.42E-03	3.97E-03	4.61E-03	6.88E-05	4.76E-03	1.63E-02
2010	3.42E-03	3.88E-03	4.40E-03	6.18E-05	3.96E-03	1.53E-02
2011	3.41E-03	3.79E-03	4.21E-03	4.38E-05	3.15E-03	1.34E-02
2012	3.38E-03	3.70E-03	4.04E-03	5.71E-05	3.79E-03	1.49E-02
2013	3.33E-03	3.61E-03	3.91E-03	4.39E-05	3.16E-03	1.35E-02
2014	3.25E-03	3.52E-03	3.82E-03	4.89E-05	3.46E-03	1.40E-02
2015	3.14E-03	3.44E-03	3.76E-03	5.33E-05	3.29E-03	1.43E-02
2016	3.02E-03	3.36E-03	3.73E-03	5.20E-05	3.39E-03	1.42E-02
2017	2.89E-03	3.27E-03	3.72E-03	5.81E-05	3.82E-03	1.50E-02
2018	2.75E-03	3.20E-03	3.71E-03	4.97E-05	3.14E-03	1.38E-02

Table 11. Basic event reliability trending data.

Failure Mode	Component ^a	Year	Number of Failures	Demands/Run Hours	Mean	Bayesian Update		Distribution
						Post A	Post B	
FTOC	AOV	1998	0	855	5.49E-04	1.11	2.02E+03	Beta
FTOC	AOV	1999	1	1,035	9.58E-04	2.11	2.20E+03	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2000	0	793	5.67E-04	1.11	1.96E+03	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2001	0	914	5.34E-04	1.11	2.08E+03	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2002	2	982	1.45E-03	3.11	2.15E+03	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2003	0	965	5.21E-04	1.11	2.13E+03	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2004	0	864	5.47E-04	1.11	2.03E+03	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2005	0	727	5.86E-04	1.11	1.90E+03	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2006	2	683	1.68E-03	3.11	1.85E+03	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2007	1	702	1.13E-03	2.11	1.87E+03	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2008	1	692	1.13E-03	2.11	1.86E+03	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2009	1	729	1.11E-03	2.11	1.90E+03	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2010	0	683	6.01E-04	1.11	1.85E+03	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2011	0	704	5.94E-04	1.11	1.87E+03	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2012	0	689	5.99E-04	1.11	1.86E+03	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2013	0	697	5.96E-04	1.11	1.86E+03	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2014	0	679	6.02E-04	1.11	1.85E+03	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2015	0	690	5.98E-04	1.11	1.86E+03	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2016	0	689	5.99E-04	1.11	1.86E+03	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2017	0	702	5.94E-04	1.11	1.87E+03	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2018	1	704	1.13E-03	2.11	1.87E+03	Beta
FTOP	AOV	1998	0	1,182,600	2.06E-07	1.42	6.90E+06	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	1999	0	1,182,600	2.06E-07	1.42	6.90E+06	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2000	0	1,182,600	2.06E-07	1.42	6.90E+06	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2001	0	1,182,600	2.06E-07	1.42	6.90E+06	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2002	0	1,182,600	2.06E-07	1.42	6.90E+06	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2003	0	1,182,600	2.06E-07	1.42	6.90E+06	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2004	0	1,182,600	2.06E-07	1.42	6.90E+06	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2005	0	1,182,600	2.06E-07	1.42	6.90E+06	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2006	0	1,182,600	2.06E-07	1.42	6.90E+06	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2007	0	1,182,600	2.06E-07	1.42	6.90E+06	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2008	0	1,182,600	2.06E-07	1.42	6.90E+06	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2009	0	1,182,600	2.06E-07	1.42	6.90E+06	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2010	0	1,182,600	2.06E-07	1.42	6.90E+06	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2011	0	1,182,600	2.06E-07	1.42	6.90E+06	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2012	0	1,182,600	2.06E-07	1.42	6.90E+06	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2013	0	1,182,600	2.06E-07	1.42	6.90E+06	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2014	0	1,182,600	2.06E-07	1.42	6.90E+06	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2015	0	1,182,600	2.06E-07	1.42	6.90E+06	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2016	0	1,182,600	2.06E-07	1.42	6.90E+06	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2017	0	1,182,600	2.06E-07	1.42	6.90E+06	Gamma

Table 11. (continued).

Failure Mode	Component ^a	Year	Number of Failures	Demands/Run Hours	Bayesian Update			Distribution
					Mean	Post A	Post B	
FTOP	AOV	2018	0	1,182,600	2.06E-07	1.42	6.90E+06	Gamma
SO	AOV	1998	0	1,182,600	1.06E-07	0.68	6.39E+06	Gamma
SO	AOV	1999	0	1,182,600	1.06E-07	0.68	6.39E+06	Gamma
SO	AOV	2000	0	1,182,600	1.06E-07	0.68	6.39E+06	Gamma
SO	AOV	2001	0	1,182,600	1.06E-07	0.68	6.39E+06	Gamma
SO	AOV	2002	0	1,182,600	1.06E-07	0.68	6.39E+06	Gamma
SO	AOV	2003	0	1,182,600	1.06E-07	0.68	6.39E+06	Gamma
SO	AOV	2004	0	1,182,600	1.06E-07	0.68	6.39E+06	Gamma
SO	AOV	2005	0	1,182,600	1.06E-07	0.68	6.39E+06	Gamma
SO	AOV	2006	0	1,182,600	1.06E-07	0.68	6.39E+06	Gamma
SO	AOV	2007	0	1,182,600	1.06E-07	0.68	6.39E+06	Gamma
SO	AOV	2008	1	1,182,600	2.63E-07	1.68	6.39E+06	Gamma
SO	AOV	2009	0	1,182,600	1.06E-07	0.68	6.39E+06	Gamma
SO	AOV	2010	0	1,182,600	1.06E-07	0.68	6.39E+06	Gamma
SO	AOV	2011	0	1,182,600	1.06E-07	0.68	6.39E+06	Gamma
SO	AOV	2012	1	1,182,600	2.63E-07	1.68	6.39E+06	Gamma
SO	AOV	2013	0	1,182,600	1.06E-07	0.68	6.39E+06	Gamma
SO	AOV	2014	0	1,182,600	1.06E-07	0.68	6.39E+06	Gamma
SO	AOV	2015	0	1,182,600	1.06E-07	0.68	6.39E+06	Gamma
SO	AOV	2016	0	1,182,600	1.06E-07	0.68	6.39E+06	Gamma
SO	AOV	2017	0	1,182,600	1.06E-07	0.68	6.39E+06	Gamma
SO	AOV	2018	0	1,182,600	1.06E-07	0.68	6.39E+06	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	1998	0	2,163,720	4.89E-07	16.5	3.37E+07	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	1999	0	2,163,720	4.89E-07	16.5	3.37E+07	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2000	2	2,163,720	5.48E-07	18.5	3.37E+07	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2001	0	2,163,720	4.89E-07	16.5	3.37E+07	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2002	0	2,163,720	4.89E-07	16.5	3.37E+07	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2003	0	2,163,720	4.89E-07	16.5	3.37E+07	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2004	0	2,163,720	4.89E-07	16.5	3.37E+07	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2005	0	2,163,720	4.89E-07	16.5	3.37E+07	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2006	0	2,163,720	4.89E-07	16.5	3.37E+07	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2007	0	2,163,720	4.89E-07	16.5	3.37E+07	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2008	0	2,163,720	4.89E-07	16.5	3.37E+07	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2009	0	2,163,720	4.89E-07	16.5	3.37E+07	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2010	0	2,163,720	4.89E-07	16.5	3.37E+07	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2011	0	2,163,720	4.89E-07	16.5	3.37E+07	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2012	0	2,163,720	4.89E-07	16.5	3.37E+07	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2013	0	2,163,720	4.89E-07	16.5	3.37E+07	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2014	0	2,163,720	4.89E-07	16.5	3.37E+07	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2015	0	2,163,720	4.89E-07	16.5	3.37E+07	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2016	0	2,163,720	4.89E-07	16.5	3.37E+07	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2017	0	2,163,720	4.89E-07	16.5	3.37E+07	Gamma

Table 11. (continued).

Failure Mode	Component ^a	Year	Number of Failures	Demands/Run Hours	Bayesian Update			Distribution
					Mean	Post A	Post B	
LOHT	HTX	2018	0	2,163,720	4.89E-07	16.5	3.37E+07	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	1998	0	107,767	4.27E-06	0.78	1.83E+05	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	1999	1	72,499	1.21E-05	1.78	1.48E+05	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2000	1	55,096	1.37E-05	1.78	1.30E+05	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2001	2	63,185	2.01E-05	2.78	1.38E+05	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2002	2	51,741	2.19E-05	2.78	1.27E+05	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2003	2	57,953	2.09E-05	2.78	1.33E+05	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2004	0	43,351	6.60E-06	0.78	1.18E+05	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2005	1	50,538	1.42E-05	1.78	1.26E+05	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2006	2	46,853	2.28E-05	2.78	1.22E+05	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2007	1	44,747	1.49E-05	1.78	1.20E+05	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2008	2	49,183	2.24E-05	2.78	1.24E+05	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2009	1	46,945	1.46E-05	1.78	1.22E+05	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2010	1	46,101	1.47E-05	1.78	1.21E+05	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2011	2	51,766	2.19E-05	2.78	1.27E+05	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2012	3	55,059	2.91E-05	3.78	1.30E+05	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2013	3	50,931	3.00E-05	3.78	1.26E+05	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2014	0	48,057	6.35E-06	0.78	1.23E+05	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2015	2	48,132	2.26E-05	2.78	1.23E+05	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2016	1	52,616	1.40E-05	1.78	1.28E+05	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2017	0	47,142	6.39E-06	0.78	1.22E+05	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2018	1	49,548	1.43E-05	1.78	1.25E+05	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	1998	0	4,457	9.46E-05	1.82	1.92E+04	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	1999	1	4,784	1.44E-04	2.82	1.96E+04	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2000	2	4,519	1.98E-04	3.82	1.93E+04	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2001	1	4,605	1.45E-04	2.82	1.94E+04	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2002	0	4,853	9.27E-05	1.82	1.96E+04	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2003	0	4,885	9.25E-05	1.82	1.97E+04	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2004	0	4,933	9.23E-05	1.82	1.97E+04	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2005	0	5,163	9.12E-05	1.82	2.00E+04	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2006	0	4,874	9.26E-05	1.82	1.97E+04	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2007	0	4,996	9.20E-05	1.82	1.98E+04	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2008	0	5,074	9.16E-05	1.82	1.99E+04	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2009	0	5,025	9.18E-05	1.82	1.98E+04	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2010	0	4,996	9.20E-05	1.82	1.98E+04	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2011	0	4,942	9.22E-05	1.82	1.97E+04	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2012	2	5,008	1.93E-04	3.82	1.98E+04	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2013	0	5,010	9.19E-05	1.82	1.98E+04	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2014	2	4,849	1.95E-04	3.82	1.96E+04	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2015	0	4,829	9.28E-05	1.82	1.96E+04	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2016	0	4,856	9.26E-05	1.82	1.96E+04	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2017	0	4,647	9.36E-05	1.82	1.94E+04	Gamma

Table 11. (continued).

Failure Mode	Component ^a	Year	Number of Failures	Demands/Run Hours	Bayesian Update			Distribution
					Mean	Post A	Post B	
FTR<1H	MDP	2018	0	4,755	9.31E-05	1.82	1.95E+04	Gamma
FTS	MDP	1998	5	4,457	1.07E-03	6.95	6.51E+03	Beta
FTS	MDP	1999	2	4,784	5.77E-04	3.95	6.84E+03	Beta
FTS	MDP	2000	6	4,519	1.21E-03	7.95	6.57E+03	Beta
FTS	MDP	2001	7	4,605	1.34E-03	8.95	6.65E+03	Beta
FTS	MDP	2002	3	4,853	7.16E-04	4.95	6.90E+03	Beta
FTS	MDP	2003	4	4,885	8.57E-04	5.95	6.93E+03	Beta
FTS	MDP	2004	4	4,933	8.51E-04	5.95	6.98E+03	Beta
FTS	MDP	2005	5	5,163	9.62E-04	6.95	7.21E+03	Beta
FTS	MDP	2006	4	4,874	8.58E-04	5.95	6.92E+03	Beta
FTS	MDP	2007	5	4,996	9.85E-04	6.95	7.04E+03	Beta
FTS	MDP	2008	3	5,074	6.94E-04	4.95	7.12E+03	Beta
FTS	MDP	2009	1	5,025	4.16E-04	2.95	7.08E+03	Beta
FTS	MDP	2010	4	4,996	8.43E-04	5.95	7.05E+03	Beta
FTS	MDP	2011	1	4,942	4.21E-04	2.95	6.99E+03	Beta
FTS	MDP	2012	3	5,008	7.00E-04	4.95	7.06E+03	Beta
FTS	MDP	2013	1	5,010	4.17E-04	2.95	7.06E+03	Beta
FTS	MDP	2014	1	4,849	4.27E-04	2.95	6.90E+03	Beta
FTS	MDP	2015	6	4,829	1.15E-03	7.95	6.88E+03	Beta
FTS	MDP	2016	4	4,856	8.61E-04	5.95	6.91E+03	Beta
FTS	MDP	2017	3	4,647	7.38E-04	4.95	6.70E+03	Beta
FTS	MDP	2018	6	4,755	1.17E-03	7.95	6.80E+03	Beta
FTOC	MOV	1998	15	12,503	1.17E-03	17.05	1.46E+04	Beta
FTOC	MOV	1999	12	14,315	8.54E-04	14.05	1.64E+04	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2000	14	12,962	1.06E-03	16.05	1.51E+04	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2001	4	14,576	3.62E-04	6.05	1.67E+04	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2002	10	13,440	7.74E-04	12.05	1.56E+04	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2003	10	13,185	7.87E-04	12.05	1.53E+04	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2004	10	12,578	8.19E-04	12.05	1.47E+04	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2005	15	11,422	1.26E-03	17.05	1.35E+04	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2006	17	10,087	1.56E-03	19.05	1.22E+04	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2007	14	9,832	1.34E-03	16.05	1.19E+04	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2008	8	9,982	8.30E-04	10.05	1.21E+04	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2009	15	9,935	1.41E-03	17.05	1.20E+04	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2010	10	9,949	9.98E-04	12.05	1.21E+04	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2011	5	10,156	5.74E-04	7.05	1.23E+04	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2012	9	10,061	9.06E-04	11.05	1.22E+04	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2013	5	10,074	5.78E-04	7.05	1.22E+04	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2014	7	10,192	7.34E-04	9.05	1.23E+04	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2015	5	10,136	5.75E-04	7.05	1.23E+04	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2016	6	10,001	6.64E-04	8.05	1.21E+04	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2017	9	9,889	9.19E-04	11.05	1.20E+04	Beta

Table 11. (continued).

Failure Mode	Component ^a	Year	Number of Failures	Demands/Run Hours	Bayesian Update			Distribution
					Mean	Post A	Post B	
FTOC	MOV	2018	3	9,884	4.20E-04	5.05	1.20E+04	Beta
FTOP	MOV	1998	1	15,619,080	6.53E-08	2.46	3.77E+07	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	1999	8	15,759,240	2.50E-07	9.46	3.78E+07	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2000	1	15,759,240	6.50E-08	2.46	3.78E+07	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2001	2	15,759,240	9.15E-08	3.46	3.78E+07	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2002	0	15,768,000	3.86E-08	1.46	3.78E+07	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2003	2	15,785,520	9.14E-08	3.46	3.78E+07	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2004	0	15,759,240	3.86E-08	1.46	3.78E+07	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2005	0	15,768,000	3.86E-08	1.46	3.78E+07	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2006	1	15,768,000	6.50E-08	2.46	3.78E+07	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2007	1	15,759,240	6.50E-08	2.46	3.78E+07	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2008	0	15,759,240	3.86E-08	1.46	3.78E+07	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2009	0	15,759,240	3.86E-08	1.46	3.78E+07	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2010	0	15,829,320	3.85E-08	1.46	3.79E+07	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2011	0	16,039,560	3.83E-08	1.46	3.81E+07	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2012	1	15,873,120	6.48E-08	2.46	3.79E+07	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2013	2	15,855,600	9.12E-08	3.46	3.79E+07	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2014	0	15,881,880	3.84E-08	1.46	3.79E+07	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2015	0	15,916,920	3.84E-08	1.46	3.80E+07	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2016	0	15,794,280	3.85E-08	1.46	3.78E+07	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2017	0	15,671,640	3.87E-08	1.46	3.77E+07	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2018	0	15,671,640	3.87E-08	1.46	3.77E+07	Gamma
SO	MOV	1998	2	15,619,080	7.92E-08	2.57	3.25E+07	Gamma
SO	MOV	1999	0	15,759,240	1.75E-08	0.57	3.26E+07	Gamma
SO	MOV	2000	2	15,759,240	7.88E-08	2.57	3.26E+07	Gamma
SO	MOV	2001	0	15,759,240	1.75E-08	0.57	3.26E+07	Gamma
SO	MOV	2002	0	15,768,000	1.75E-08	0.57	3.26E+07	Gamma
SO	MOV	2003	1	15,785,520	4.81E-08	1.57	3.26E+07	Gamma
SO	MOV	2004	0	15,759,240	1.75E-08	0.57	3.26E+07	Gamma
SO	MOV	2005	0	15,768,000	1.75E-08	0.57	3.26E+07	Gamma
SO	MOV	2006	0	15,768,000	1.75E-08	0.57	3.26E+07	Gamma
SO	MOV	2007	1	15,759,240	4.82E-08	1.57	3.26E+07	Gamma
SO	MOV	2008	0	15,759,240	1.75E-08	0.57	3.26E+07	Gamma
SO	MOV	2009	0	15,759,240	1.75E-08	0.57	3.26E+07	Gamma
SO	MOV	2010	0	15,829,320	1.75E-08	0.57	3.27E+07	Gamma
SO	MOV	2011	0	16,039,560	1.73E-08	0.57	3.29E+07	Gamma
SO	MOV	2012	0	15,873,120	1.74E-08	0.57	3.27E+07	Gamma
SO	MOV	2013	1	15,855,600	4.80E-08	1.57	3.27E+07	Gamma
SO	MOV	2014	1	15,881,880	4.80E-08	1.57	3.27E+07	Gamma
SO	MOV	2015	2	15,916,920	7.85E-08	2.57	3.28E+07	Gamma
SO	MOV	2016	0	15,794,280	1.75E-08	0.57	3.26E+07	Gamma
SO	MOV	2017	0	15,671,640	1.75E-08	0.57	3.25E+07	Gamma

Table 11. (continued).

Failure Mode	Component ^a	Year	Number of Failures	Demands/Run Hours	Mean	Bayesian Update		Distribution
						Post A	Post B	
SO	MOV	2018	0	15,671,640	1.75E-08	0.57	3.25E+07	Gamma

- a. AOV = air-operated valve
 HTX = heat exchanger
 LOHT = loss of heat transfer
 MDP = motor-driven pump
 MOV = motor-operated valve.

Table 12. Basic event UA trending data.

Failure Mode	Component	Year	UA Hours	Critical Hours	Bayesian Update			
					Mean	Post A	Post B	Distribution
UA	HDR	2002	65.50999	99,780	6.55E-04	0.58	8.83E+02	Beta
UA	HDR	2003	74.87	116,710	4.49E-04	0.44	9.73E+02	Beta
UA	HDR	2004	89.83	130,034	5.94E-04	0.28	4.73E+02	Beta
UA	HDR	2005	58.15	133,104	3.69E-04	0.68	1.83E+03	Beta
UA	HDR	2006	71.01	128,734	5.05E-04	0.26	5.16E+02	Beta
UA	HDR	2007	76.46	129,191	4.99E-04	0.36	7.19E+02	Beta
UA	HDR	2008	126.52	134,841	8.17E-04	0.23	2.81E+02	Beta
UA	HDR	2009	39.06	126,568	2.82E-04	0.28	1.01E+03	Beta
UA	HDR	2010	41.96	117,219	2.90E-04	0.3	1.02E+03	Beta
UA	HDR	2011	125.89	124,993	8.09E-04	0.28	3.49E+02	Beta
UA	HDR	2012	110.39	113,692	1.05E-03	0.17	1.60E+02	Beta
UA	HDR	2013	199.94	121,526	1.40E-03	0.19	1.33E+02	Beta
UA	HDR	2014	128.12	121,838	1.15E-03	0.17	1.51E+02	Beta
UA	HDR	2015	63.4	117,481	5.03E-04	0.45	8.99E+02	Beta
UA	HDR	2016	143.32	121,760	1.14E-03	0.21	1.85E+02	Beta
UA	HDR	2017	114.88	119,345	9.09E-04	0.38	4.22E+02	Beta
UA	HDR	2018	18.49	115,317	1.09E-04	0.34	3.13E+03	Beta
UA	HTX	2002	81.17	67,910	1.17E-03	0.81	6.91E+02	Beta
UA	HTX	2003	76.37	65,155	1.15E-03	1.83	1.59E+03	Beta
UA	HTX	2004	92.61	64,551	1.35E-03	0.91	6.71E+02	Beta
UA	HTX	2005	131.19	66,989	1.98E-03	1.37	6.90E+02	Beta
UA	HTX	2006	129.23	63,643	1.93E-03	1.49	7.71E+02	Beta
UA	HTX	2007	101.47	63,978	1.52E-03	0.97	6.38E+02	Beta
UA	HTX	2008	202.29	68,462	3.00E-03	0.75	2.48E+02	Beta
UA	HTX	2009	191.61	63,561	2.85E-03	0.98	3.45E+02	Beta
UA	HTX	2010	81.8	64,938	1.19E-03	0.58	4.88E+02	Beta
UA	HTX	2011	69.02	66,804	1.02E-03	0.64	6.32E+02	Beta
UA	HTX	2012	164.42	57,594	2.51E-03	0.73	2.91E+02	Beta
UA	HTX	2013	99.44	65,388	1.50E-03	0.36	2.40E+02	Beta
UA	HTX	2014	238.16	62,876	3.62E-03	0.82	2.25E+02	Beta
UA	HTX	2015	191.66	62,816	2.86E-03	1.14	3.98E+02	Beta
UA	HTX	2016	98.06	68,307	1.45E-03	1.67	1.14E+03	Beta
UA	HTX	2017	174.33	64,723	2.64E-03	0.98	3.71E+02	Beta
UA	HTX	2018	117.17	52,180	1.72E-03	0.75	4.32E+02	Beta
UA	MDP	2002	8884.24	1,593,597	5.63E-03	1.68	2.97E+02	Beta
UA	MDP	2003	9772.959	1,720,085	5.50E-03	1.57	2.83E+02	Beta
UA	MDP	2004	9175.799	1,822,984	4.94E-03	1.83	3.70E+02	Beta
UA	MDP	2005	9058.934	1,798,788	4.98E-03	1.8	3.60E+02	Beta
UA	MDP	2006	8793.487	1,806,084	4.64E-03	1.41	3.04E+02	Beta
UA	MDP	2007	8816.43	1,828,617	4.79E-03	1.68	3.50E+02	Beta
UA	MDP	2008	8992.06	1,816,831	4.86E-03	1.75	3.58E+02	Beta

Failure Mode	Component	Year	UA Hours	Critical Hours	Bayesian Update			
					Mean	Post A	Post B	Distribution
UA	MDP	2009	10340.6	1,788,238	5.57E-03	1.86	3.32E+02	Beta
UA	MDP	2010	10231.1	1,812,125	5.55E-03	2.11	3.78E+02	Beta
UA	MDP	2011	9073.84	1,751,567	5.05E-03	1.59	3.14E+02	Beta
UA	MDP	2012	9931.96	1,703,781	5.46E-03	1.88	3.43E+02	Beta
UA	MDP	2013	9644.48	1,725,621	4.94E-03	1.16	2.33E+02	Beta
UA	MDP	2014	10050	1,758,886	5.37E-03	1.84	3.40E+02	Beta
UA	MDP	2015	8554.99	1,737,119	4.80E-03	1.62	3.37E+02	Beta
UA	MDP	2016	7776.85	1,716,086	4.44E-03	2.46	5.51E+02	Beta
UA	MDP	2017	7963.6	1,682,602	4.69E-03	1.22	2.58E+02	Beta
UA	MDP	2018	7887.89	1,670,807	4.59E-03	1.33	2.88E+02	Beta
a. HDR = header.								

Table 13. Failure mode acronyms.

Failure Mode	Failure Mode Description
FTOC	Fail to open/close
FTOP	Fail to operate
FTR	Fail to run
FTR>1H	Fail to run more than one hour (standby)
FTR<1H	Fail to run less than one hour
FTS	Fail to start
LOHT	Loss of heat transfer
SO	Spurious operation
UA	Unavailability (maintenance or state of another component)

7. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

Being a multipurpose system, RHR provides many important functional configurations generally known as modes of operation. The different modes of RHR operation can include

- Low Pressure Coolant/Safety Injection
- Shutdown Cooling
- Suppression Pool Cooling (SPC) or Containment Sump Recirculation
- Containment Spray
- Fuel Pool Cooling.

The fundamental differences between plants can be summarized as some plants have dedicated SDC systems, plants either use an intermediate closed cooling system or use a direct heat sink source of cooling to the RHR heat exchangers, plants have differing number of pumps (from 2 to 4), and the loop suction valve configuration is a single path with two valves or there are multiple paths. The RHR configurations at each plant are shown in Table 14. Figure 27 shows a generic depiction of a RHR system.

7.1 Low-Pressure injection Mode

The LPI mode of the RHR system is primarily designed to mitigate the loss of coolant accidents (large and medium). During the injection phase of operation following a large LOCA, the RHR operates as an open-loop system and provides rapid injection of coolant to the primary system to ensure reactor shutdown and adequate core cooling. LPI operation is initiated automatically.

Considering the above process, LPI operation requires

- Opening discharge valves (AOV or MOV)
- Starting and running one or more RHR pumps

Either offsite or onsite emergency power may be used to operate RHR pumps and valves.

7.2 Shutdown Cooling Mode

For the SDC mode of the RHR system, the flow path is different from LPI and SPC or containment sump recirculation in that the suction source is the reactor via the reactor recirculation line or hot leg. From the recirculation line or the hot legs, water flows through two motor-operated isolation valves in series, the first being located inside containment while the second is outside containment. This is then followed by individual suction isolation valves for each train, then to the suction of each pump.

The RHR system in SDC mode removes fission product decay heat from the reactor core and sensible heat from RCS components during system cooldowns and at cold shutdown. The design pressure limits for the RHR system are lower than the RCS, so the system is isolated from the RCS during power operation. During RCS cooldowns to cold shutdown, the RHR system remains isolated until RCS temperature and pressure are below interlock setpoints.

SDC is not automatic. The RHR system is cold relative to the RCS, so RHR components must undergo a heatup process prior to use. RHR heat transfer (RCS cooldown) is controlled by heat exchanger cooling water valve adjustment.

Considering the above process, SDC operation requires

- Opening suction and discharge valves (AOV or MOV)

- Starting and running one or more RHR pumps
- Establishing cooling water flow to the RHR heat exchanger
- Isolating the heat exchanger bypass
- Flow control through minimum flow valves
- Flow control of cooling water.

Either offsite or onsite emergency power may be used to operate RHR pumps and valves.

Two basic types of heat sinks are used at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The first is referred to here as a direct heat sink and the second is referred to here as an indirect (or intermediate) heat sink:

Direct Heat Sink—The direct heat sink generally uses a standby service water system to provide the heat sink for SDC. In some plants this is a dedicated residual heat removal service water system; in other plants, the emergency service water system is used. Either way, since the system is in standby, the pumps must be started to provide cooling.

Indirect Heat Sink—The plants with an indirect heat sink use a closed cooling water system such as the reactor building closed cooling water system as the first heat removal provider. The heat is ultimately removed by a normally running service water system. The main purpose of this intermediate cooling water system is to provide a barrier to the release of radioactive liquid to the environment.

Residual Heat Removal System




Figure 27. Generic depiction of the RHR system.

Table 14. Listing of the RHR design classes.^a

Plant	Vendor	LPI Tree	SDC Tree ^b	BWR Containment	BWR Design	PWR Loops	Shutdown Cooling Class	Injection Class
Arkansas 1	BW	LPI	DHR			2	Direct-Single	2 pumps; BW
Arkansas 2	CE	LPI	SDC			2	Direct-Single	2 pumps; CE
Beaver Valley 1	WE	LPI	RHR			3	Single Use	2 pumps; WE
Beaver Valley 2	WE	LPI	RHR			3	Single Use	2 pumps; WE
Braidwood 1	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Braidwood 2	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Browns Ferry 1	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Browns Ferry 2	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Browns Ferry 3	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Brunswick 1	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I(C)	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Brunswick 2	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I(C)	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Byron 1	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Byron 2	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Callaway	WE	LPI	RHR		SNUPPS	4	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Calvert Cliffs 1	CE	LPI	SDC			2	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; CE
Calvert Cliffs 2	CE	LPI	SDC			2	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; CE
Catawba 1	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Catawba 2	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Clinton 1	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK III(C)	B-CLASS 6		Direct-Single	2 pumps; GE
Columbia 2	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK II	B-CLASS 5		Direct-Single	2 pumps; GE
Comanche Peak 1	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Comanche Peak 2	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Cook 1	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Cook 2	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Cooper	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Crystal River 3	BW	LPI	DHR			2	Direct-Single	2 pumps; BW
Davis-Besse	BW	LPI	DHR			2	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; BW
Diablo Canyon 1	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Diablo Canyon 2	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Dresden 2	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 3		Single Use	3 pumps; GE
Dresden 3	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 3		Single Use	3 pumps; GE
Duane Arnold	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Farley 1	WE	LPI	RHR			3	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Farley 2	WE	LPI	RHR			3	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Fermi 2	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
FitzPatrick	GE	LCI	SPC	MARK I	B-CLASS 4		No suction modeled	4 pumps; GE
Fort Calhoun	CE	LPI	SDC			2	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; CE
Ginna	WE	LPI	RHR			2	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Grand Gulf	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK III(C)	B-CLASS 6		Direct-Single	2 pumps; GE
Harris	WE	LPI	RHR			3	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Hatch 1	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Hatch 2	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Hope Creek	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	2 pumps; GE
Indian Point 2	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE

Plant	Vendor	LPI Tree	SDC Tree ^b	BWR Containment	BWR Design	PWR Loops	Shutdown Cooling Class	Injection Class
Indian Point 3	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Kewaunee	WE	LPI	RHR			2	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
La Salle 1	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK II(C)	B-CLASS 5		Direct-Single	2 pumps; GE
La Salle 2	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK II(C)	B-CLASS 5		Direct-Single	2 pumps; GE
Limerick 1	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK II(C)	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Limerick 2	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK II(C)	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
McGuire 1	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
McGuire 2	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Millstone 2	CE	LPI	SDC			2	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; CE
Millstone 3	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Monticello	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 3		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Nine Mile Pt. 1	GE	LCS	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 2		Single Use	3 pumps; GE
Nine Mile Pt. 2	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK II(C)	B-CLASS 5		Direct-Single	2 pumps; GE
North Anna 1	WE	LPI	RHR			3	Single Use	2 pumps; WE
North Anna 2	WE	LPI	RHR			3	Single Use	2 pumps; WE
Oconee 1	BW	LPI	DHR			2	Indirect-Single	3 pumps; BW
Oconee 2	BW	LPI	DHR			2	Indirect-Single	3 pumps; BW
Oconee 3	BW	LPI	DHR			2	Indirect-Single	3 pumps; BW
Oyster Creek	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 2		Single Use	3 pumps; GE
Palisades	CE	LPI	SDC			2	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; CE
Palo Verde 1	CE	LPI	SDC		SYSTEM 80	2	Direct-Multiple	4 pumps; CE
Palo Verde 2	CE	LPI	SDC		SYSTEM 80	2	Direct-Multiple	4 pumps; CE
Palo Verde 3	CE	LPI	SDC		SYSTEM 80	2	Direct-Multiple	4 pumps; CE
Peach Bottom 2	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Peach Bottom 3	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Perry	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK III	B-CLASS 6		Indirect-Single	2 pumps; GE
Pilgrim	GE	LCI	SPC	MARK I	B-CLASS 3		No suction modeled	4 pumps; GE
Point Beach 1	WE	LPI	RHR			2	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Point Beach 2	WE	LPI	RHR			2	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Prairie Island 1	WE	LPI	RHR			2	Direct-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Prairie Island 2	WE	LPI	RHR			2	Direct-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Quad Cities 1	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 3		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Quad Cities 2	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 3		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
River Bend	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK III	B-CLASS 6		Direct-Single	2 pumps; GE
Robinson 2	WE	LPI	RHR			3	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Salem 1	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Salem 2	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
San Onofre 2	CE	LPI	SDC			2	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; CE
San Onofre 3	CE	LPI	SDC			2	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; CE
Seabrook	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Sequoyah 1	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Sequoyah 2	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
South Texas 1	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Multiple	3 pumps; WE
South Texas 2	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Multiple	3 pumps; WE
St. Lucie 1	CE	LPI	SDC			2	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; CE

Plant	Vendor	LPI Tree	SDC Tree ^b	BWR Containment	BWR Design	PWR Loops	Shutdown Cooling Class	Injection Class
St. Lucie 2	CE	LPI	SDC		2HL/4CL	2	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; CE
Summer	WE	LPI	RHR			3	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Surry 1	WE	LPI	RHR			3	Single Use	2 pumps; WE
Surry 2	WE	LPI	RHR			3	Single Use	2 pumps; WE
Susquehanna 1	GE	LCI	SPC	MARK II(C)	B-CLASS 4		No suction modeled	4 pumps; GE
Susquehanna 2	GE	LCI	SPC	MARK II(C)	B-CLASS 4		No suction modeled	4 pumps; GE
Three Mile Isl 1	BW	LPI	DHR			2	Single Train	2 pumps; BW
Turkey Point 3	WE	LPI	RHR			3	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Turkey Point 4	WE	LPI	RHR			3	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Vermont Yankee	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Vogtle 1	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Vogtle 2	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Waterford 3	CE	LPI	SDC		2HL/4CL	2	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; CE
Watts Bar 1	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Wolf Creek	WE	LPI	RHR		SNUPPS	4	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE

a. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, *Overview and Comparison of U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants*, NUREG/CR-5640, SAIC-89/1541, September 1990.

b. DHR = decay heat removal.

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