

# **System Study: Residual Heat Removal 1998–2013**

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Residual Heat Removal  
1998–2013**

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## **ABSTRACT**

This report presents an unreliability evaluation of the residual heat removal (RHR) system in two modes of operation (low-pressure injection in response to a large loss-of-coolant accident and post-trip shutdown-cooling) at 104 U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. Demand, run hours, and failure data from fiscal year 1998 through 2013 for selected components were obtained from the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Consolidated Events Database (ICES). The unreliability results are trended for the most recent 10-year period while yearly estimates for system unreliability are provided for the entire active period. No statistically significant trends were identified in the RHR results.



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## ACRONYMS

AOV	air-operated valve
BW	Babcock and Wilcox
BWR	boiling water reactor
CCF	common-cause failure
CE	Combustion Engineering
DHR	decay heat removal
FTOC	fail to open/close
FTOP	fail to operate
FTR	fail to run
FTR>1H	fail to run more than one hour (standby)
FTR<1H	fail to run less than one hour
FTS	fail to start
FY	fiscal year
GE	General Electric
GTG	gas turbine generator
HPCI	high-pressure coolant injection
HTG	hydro turbine generator
HTX	heat exchanger
ICES	INPO Consolidated Events Database
INPO	Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
LOHT	loss of heat transfer
LLOCA	large loss-of-coolant accident
LPI	low-pressure injection
MDP	motor-driven pump
MOV	motor-operated valve
MSPI	Mitigating Systems Performance Index
PRA	probabilistic risk assessment
RCS	reactor coolant system
RHR	residual heat removal
SDC	shutdown-cooling
SO	spurious operation
SPAR	standardized plant analysis risk
SPC	suppression pool cooling
SSU	safety system unavailability
UA	unavailability (maintenance or state of another component)
WE	Westinghouse Electric



# System Study: Residual Heat Removal 1998–2013

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The residual heat removal (RHR) system is typically a multiple use system with modes of operation for low-pressure injection, shutdown cooling, suppression pool or containment sump cooling, and/or containment spray. Some plants have dedicated systems to accomplish one or more of these modes. This report presents an unreliability evaluation over time of the RHR system in two modes of operation—low-pressure injection (LPI) in response to a large loss-of-coolant accident (LLOCA) and post-trip shutdown-cooling (SDC)—at 104 U.S. commercial nuclear power plants.

Demand, run hours, and failure data from fiscal year (FY)-98 through FY-12 for selected components in the RHR system were obtained from the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Consolidated Events Database (ICES). Train unavailability data (outages from test or maintenance) were obtained from the Reactor Oversight Process Safety System Unavailability (SSU) database (FY-98 through FY-01) and the Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI) database (FY-02 through FY-12). Common-cause failure (CCF) data used in the models are from the 2010 update to the CCF database. The system unreliability results are trended for the most recent 10-year period while yearly estimates for system unreliability are provided for the entire active period.

This report does not attempt to estimate basic event values for use in a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). Suggested values for such use are presented in the [2010 Component Reliability Update](#) (Reference 1), which is an update to Reference 2 ([NUREG/CR-6928](#)). Baseline RHR unreliability results using basic event values from that report are summarized in Section 3. Trend results for RHR (using system-specific data) are presented in Section 4. Similar to previous system study updates, Section 5 contains importance information (using the baseline results from Section 3), and Section 7 describes the RHR system.

All models include failures due to unavailability while in test or maintenance. Human error has not been included in the SPAR model logic. Human actions for various recovery actions are included. An overview of the trending methods, glossary of terms, and abbreviations can be found in the [Overview and Reference document](#) on the Reactor Operational Experience Results and Databases web page.

### 1.1 Low-Pressure Injection Mode

Table 1 shows the definitions of the design classes used in the low-pressure injection mode of operation sections of this report. For each plant the corresponding SPAR model (version model indicated in Table 3) was used in the calculations. The low-pressure injection mode represents the use of the system as it is normally lined up during power operations. The RHR system in low-pressure injection mode is an automatically initiated event.

The RHR is categorized by the number of redundant low-pressure injection pumps and the plant vendor design as the most significant differences noted between systems at plants for the low-pressure injection mode. Table 3 summarizes the plants and their LPI classes.

Two versions of the low-pressure injection mode models for the RHR system are calculated. The RHR start-only model is the SPAR RHR low-pressure injection mode model modified by setting all fail-to-run basic events to zero (False), setting all recovery events to False, all room cooling events to False, and all pump cooling events to False. The 8-hour mission model includes all basic events in the SPAR RHR low-pressure injection mode model.

Table 1. RHR low-pressure injection class definitions.

RHR Injection Class	Description	Number of Plants
2 pumps; BW	Two RHR pump Babcock and Wilcox (BW) Design	4
2 pumps; CE	Two RHR pump Combustion Engineering (CE) Design	11
2 pumps; GE	Two RHR pump General Electric (GE) Design	9
2 pumps; WE	Two RHR pump Westinghouse (WE) Design	46
3 pumps; BW	Three RHR pump Babcock and Wilcox Design	3
3 pumps; GE	Three RHR pump General Electric Design	4
3 pumps; WE	Three RHR pump Westinghouse Design	2
4 pumps; CE	Four RHR pump Combustion Engineering Design	3
4 pumps; GE	Four RHR pump General Electric Design	22
Total		104

## 1.2 Shutdown Cooling Mode

Table 2 shows the definitions of the design classes used in the shutdown-cooling mode of operation sections of this report. For each plant the corresponding Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model (version model indicated in Table 3) was used in the calculations.

The shutdown-cooling mode represents the most challenging (more risk-significant at PWRs than in BWRs) use of the equipment since the heat exchangers are required to function and valves must be repositioned to initiate the cooldown function. The RHR system in shutdown cooling mode is a manually initiated event. Each fault tree modeling the shutdown-cooling mode of RHR includes a human action basic event to model the initiation. This basic event always comes out as the most important basic event in the model. To evaluate the system in more detail, the human action to initiate shutdown cooling was trimmed from the fault tree.

The RHR shutdown-cooling mode is categorized by the heat sink method in this report as the most significant difference noted between systems at plants. The direct heat sink takes sensible heat from the reactor coolant system (RCS) and transfers it directly to the ultimate heat sink (a variation of a service water system either dedicated or shared with other safety systems). The indirect heat sink transfers sensible heat to a closed cooling water system, which in turn transfers the heat to the ultimate heat sink. Table 3 summarizes the plants and their classes.

Two variations of the shutdown-cooling modes for the RHR system are calculated. The RHR start-only variation is the SPAR RHR shutdown cooling model modified by setting all fail-to-run basic events to zero (False), setting all recovery events to False, all room cooling events to False, and all pump cooling events to False. The 24-hour mission variation includes all basic events in the SPAR RHR shutdown-cooling model.

*Table 2. RHR shutdown cooling mode design class definitions.*

<b>RHR Shutdown Cooling Design Class</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Number of Plants</b>
Direct-Multiple	Direct heat sink, uses multiple suction paths	5
Direct-Single	Direct heat sink, uses a single suction path	29
Indirect-Multiple	Indirect heat sink, uses multiple suction paths	24
Indirect-Single	Indirect heat sink, uses a single suction path	31
No suction modeled	Models do not include the suction path valves (model suppression pool cooling only)	4
Single Train	Only one train is used in the model	1
Single Use	Plants with a single-use SDC system	10
<b>Total</b>		<b>104</b>

Table 3. RHR design class summary.

Plant	Version	Injection Class	Shutdown Cooling Class	Plant	Version	Injection Class	Shutdown Cooling Class
Arkansas 1	8.19	2 pumps; BW	Direct-Single	Indian Point 3	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single
Arkansas 2	8.21	2 pumps; CE	Direct-Single	Kewaunee	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple
Beaver Valley 1	8.22	2 pumps; WE	Single Use	La Salle 1	8.21	2 pumps; GE	Direct-Single
Beaver Valley 2	8.23	2 pumps; WE	Single Use	La Salle 2	8.21	2 pumps; GE	Direct-Single
Braidwood 1	8.21	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple	Limerick 1	8.20	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single
Braidwood 2	8.21	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple	Limerick 2	8.19	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single
Browns Ferry 1	8.22	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	McGuire 1	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single
Browns Ferry 2	8.22	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	McGuire 2	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single
Browns Ferry 3	8.18	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	Millstone 2	8.17	2 pumps; CE	Indirect-Single
Brunswick 1	8.20	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	Millstone 3	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple
Brunswick 2	8.20	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	Monticello	8.20	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single
Byron 1	8.21	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple	Nine Mile Pt. 1	8.21	3 pumps; GE	Single Use
Byron 2	8.21	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple	Nine Mile Pt. 2	8.17	2 pumps; GE	Direct-Single
Callaway	8.21	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple	North Anna 1	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Single Use
Calvert Cliffs 1	8.22	2 pumps; CE	Indirect-Single	North Anna 2	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Single Use
Calvert Cliffs 2	8.21	2 pumps; CE	Indirect-Single	Oconee 1	8.19	3 pumps; BW	Indirect-Single
Catawba 1	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single	Oconee 2	8.19	3 pumps; BW	Indirect-Single
Catawba 2	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single	Oconee 3	8.19	3 pumps; BW	Indirect-Single
Clinton 1	8.17	2 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	Oyster Creek	8.22	3 pumps; GE	Single Use
Columbia 2	8.16	2 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	Palisades	8.20	2 pumps; CE	Indirect-Single
Comanche Peak 1	8.21	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple	Palo Verde 1	8.20	4 pumps; CE	Direct-Multiple
Comanche Peak 2	8.21	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple	Palo Verde 2	8.20	4 pumps; CE	Direct-Multiple
Cook 1	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single	Palo Verde 3	8.20	4 pumps; CE	Direct-Multiple
Cook 2	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single	Peach Bottom 2	8.25	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single
Cooper	8.22	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	Peach Bottom 3	8.21	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single
Crystal River 3	8.16	2 pumps; BW	Direct-Single	Perry	8.19	2 pumps; GE	Indirect-Single
Davis-Besse	8.19	2 pumps; BW	Indirect-Single	Pilgrim	8.21	4 pumps; GE	No suction modeled
Diablo Canyon 1	8.19	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single	Point Beach 1	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single
Diablo Canyon 2	8.19	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single	Point Beach 2	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single
Dresden 2	8.18	3 pumps; GE	Single Use	Prairie Island 1	8.19	2 pumps; WE	Direct-Multiple
Dresden 3	8.18	3 pumps; GE	Single Use	Prairie Island 2	8.19	2 pumps; WE	Direct-Multiple
Duane Arnold	8.22	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	Quad Cities 1	8.18	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single
Farley 1	8.18	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple	Quad Cities 2	8.18	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single
Farley 2	8.18	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple	River Bend	8.20	2 pumps; GE	Direct-Single
Fermi 2	8.20	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	Robinson 2	8.17	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single
FitzPatrick	8.17	4 pumps; GE	No suction modeled	Salem 1	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single
Fort Calhoun	8.20	2 pumps; CE	Indirect-Single	Salem 2	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single
Ginna	8.23	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single	San Onofre 2	8.22	2 pumps; CE	Indirect-Multiple
Grand Gulf	8.22	2 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	San Onofre 3	8.22	2 pumps; CE	Indirect-Multiple
Harris	8.23	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple	Seabrook	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple
Hatch 1	8.20	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	Sequoyah 1	8.16	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single
Hatch 2	8.20	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	Sequoyah 2	8.16	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single
Hope Creek	8.18	2 pumps; GE	Direct-Single	South Texas 1	8.17	3 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple
Indian Point 2	8.19	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single	South Texas 2	8.17	3 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple



Table 3. (continued).

Plant	Version	Injection Class	Shutdown Cooling Class	Plant	Version	Injection Class	Shutdown Cooling Class
St. Lucie 1	8.19	2 pumps; CE	Indirect-Multiple	Turkey Point 3	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single
St. Lucie 2	8.19	2 pumps; CE	Indirect-Multiple	Turkey Point 4	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single
Summer	8.23	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple	Vermont Yankee	8.19	4 pumps; GE	Direct-Single
Surry 1	8.19	2 pumps; WE	Single Use	Vogtle 1	8.21	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple
Surry 2	8.15	2 pumps; WE	Single Use	Vogtle 2	8.21	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple
Susquehanna 1	8.23	4 pumps; GE	No suction modeled	Waterford 3	8.16	2 pumps; CE	Indirect-Multiple
Susquehanna 2	8.21	4 pumps; GE	No suction modeled	Watts Bar 1	8.16	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Single
Three Mile Isl 1	8.20	2 pumps; BW	Single Train	Wolf Creek	8.20	2 pumps; WE	Indirect-Multiple



## 2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The results of this RHR system unreliability study are summarized in this section. Of particular interest is the existence of any statistically significant<sup>a</sup> increasing trends. In this update, no statistically significant trends were identified in the RHR unreliability trend results.

The industry-wide RHR low-pressure injection mode start-only and 8-hour basic event group importances were evaluated and are shown in Figure 9. In both cases, the leading contributors to RHR LPI system unreliability are the RHR motor-driven pumps followed by the injection flow path. Section 5 shows importance charts for each RHR LPI class.

The industry-wide RHR shutdown-cooling mode start-only and 24-hour basic event group importances were evaluated and are shown in Figure 19. In both cases, the leading contributor to RHR SDC system unreliability in the shutdown-cooling mode is the human action to reposition the valves in the suction flow path followed by random failures of the injection flow path. The suction was the third most important segment. Section 5 shows importance charts for each RHR SDC class. For those plants with a single suction source, the suction segment importance increases significantly. For those plants that have multiple suction sources, the pump importance increases since the suction segment importance decreases. The distinction between the heat sink types (direct versus indirect) is not very large. This is due to the standby nature of most of the direct heat sink systems and the normally operating nature of the indirect heat sink systems.

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a. Statistically significant is defined in terms of the 'p-value.' A p-value is a probability indicating whether to accept or reject the null hypothesis that there is no trend in the data. P-values of less than or equal to 0.05 indicate that we are 95% confident that there is a trend in the data (reject the null hypothesis of no trend.) By convention, we use the "Michelin Guide" scale: p-value < 0.05 (statistically significant), p-value < 0.01 (highly statistically significant); p-value < 0.001 (extremely statistically significant).



### 3. INDUSTRY-WIDE UNRELIABILITY

#### 3.1 Low-Pressure Injection Mode

The RHR low-pressure injection mode fault trees (not all SPAR models label the appropriate fault tree as ‘LPI’, Table 14 lists the fault tree that was evaluated for this report) from the SPAR models were evaluated for each of the 104 operating U.S. commercial pressurized water nuclear power plants with an RHR system.

The industry-wide unreliability of the RHR system has been estimated for two modes of operation. A start-only model and an 8-hour mission model were evaluated. The uncertainty distributions for RHR show both plant design variability and parameter uncertainty while using industry-wide component failure data (FY-98 through FY-10).<sup>a</sup> Table 4 shows the percentiles and mean of the aggregated sample data (Latin hypercube, 1000 samples for each model) collected from the uncertainty calculations of the RHR fault trees in the SPAR models. In Figure 1 and Figure 2, the 5th and 95th percentiles and mean point estimates are shown for each RHR class and for the industry.

In Figure 1 and Figure 2, the width of the distribution for a class is affected by the differences in the plant modeling and the parameter uncertainty used in the models. Because the width is affected by the plant modeling, the width is also affected by the number of different plant models in a class. For those classes with very few plants that share a design, the width can be very small.

Table 4. Industry-wide unreliability values.

Model	RHR Grouping	Lower (5%)	Median	Mean	Upper (95%)
Start-only	Industry	7.08E-06	4.95E-05	2.60E-04	8.57E-04
	2 pumps; BW	3.08E-05	1.77E-04	3.42E-04	1.09E-03
	2 pumps; CE	1.59E-05	5.74E-05	9.27E-04	5.77E-03
	2 pumps; GE	7.19E-06	6.77E-05	1.54E-04	5.56E-04
	2 pumps; WE	8.94E-06	4.23E-05	1.42E-04	8.55E-04
	3 pumps; BW	1.43E-05	6.49E-05	1.23E-04	4.00E-04
	3 pumps; GE	3.00E-07	4.03E-05	6.70E-05	1.89E-04
	3 pumps; WE	1.55E-06	8.02E-06	1.01E-05	2.70E-05
	4 pumps; CE	2.05E-05	7.06E-05	8.73E-05	2.09E-04
	4 pumps; GE	7.06E-06	5.18E-05	2.83E-04	8.34E-04
8-hour Mission	Industry	1.07E-05	6.85E-05	3.07E-04	8.96E-04
	2 pumps; BW	4.52E-05	1.94E-04	3.64E-04	1.13E-03
	2 pumps; CE	2.57E-05	8.57E-05	9.92E-04	6.07E-03
	2 pumps; GE	8.53E-06	1.02E-04	2.16E-04	7.32E-04
	2 pumps; WE	1.64E-05	5.80E-05	1.50E-04	8.62E-04
	3 pumps; BW	2.74E-05	1.27E-04	1.88E-04	5.65E-04
	3 pumps; GE	1.89E-06	4.27E-05	6.98E-05	1.89E-04
	3 pumps; WE	4.80E-06	1.38E-05	1.60E-05	3.41E-05
	4 pumps; CE	4.53E-05	1.43E-04	5.09E-04	5.56E-04
	4 pumps; GE	7.93E-06	6.84E-05	3.55E-04	1.39E-03

a. By using industry-wide component failure data, individual plant performance is not included in the distribution of results.




Figure 1. RHR low-pressure injection mode start-only mission unreliability for class and industry-wide groupings.




Figure 2. RHR low-pressure injection mode 8-hour mission unreliability for class and industry-wide groupings.

## 3.2 Shutdown Cooling Mode

The RHR shutdown cooling mode fault trees (not all SPAR models label the appropriate fault tree as 'RHR', Table 14 lists the fault tree that was evaluated for this report) from the SPAR models were evaluated for each of the 104 operating U.S. commercial pressurized water nuclear power plants with an RHR system.

The industry-wide unreliability of the RHR system has been estimated for two modes of operation. A start-only model and a 24-hour mission model were evaluated. The uncertainty distributions for RHR show both plant design variability and parameter uncertainty while using industry-wide component failure data (FY-98 through FY-10).<sup>a</sup> Table 5 shows the percentiles and mean of the aggregated sample data (Latin hypercube, 1000 samples for each model) collected from the uncertainty calculations of the RHR fault trees in the SPAR models. In Figure 3 and Figure 4, the 5th and 95th percentiles and mean point estimates are shown for each RHR class and for the industry.

In Figure 3 and Figure 4, the width of the distribution for a class is affected by the differences in the plant modeling and the parameter uncertainty used in the models. Because the width is affected by the plant modeling, the width is also affected by the number of different plant models in a class. For those classes with very few plants that share a design, the width can be very small.

Table 5. Industry-wide shutdown cooling mode unreliability values.

Model	RHR Grouping	Lower (5%)	Median	Mean	Upper (95%)
Start-only	Industry	1.80E-04	2.81E-03	4.39E-03	1.39E-02
	Direct-Single	4.08E-04	2.38E-03	3.03E-03	7.71E-03
	Direct-Multiple	5.15E-04	2.02E-03	2.99E-03	8.67E-03
	No Suction Modeled	2.82E-06	1.38E-04	4.07E-04	1.73E-03
	Indirect-Single	1.13E-03	4.04E-03	5.68E-03	1.39E-02
	Indirect-Multiple	1.20E-04	1.57E-03	2.72E-03	9.06E-03
	Single Use	7.45E-04	7.82E-03	9.81E-03	2.41E-02
	Single Train	9.67E-03	1.79E-02	1.93E-02	3.47E-02
24-hour Mission	Industry	2.23E-04	2.93E-03	4.57E-03	1.44E-02
	Direct-Single	4.22E-04	2.44E-03	3.11E-03	7.78E-03
	Direct-Multiple	6.84E-04	2.33E-03	3.56E-03	9.40E-03
	No Suction Modeled	1.37E-05	1.79E-04	4.35E-04	1.74E-03
	Indirect-Single	1.19E-03	4.18E-03	5.84E-03	1.41E-02
	Indirect-Multiple	1.64E-04	1.69E-03	2.81E-03	9.16E-03
	Single Use	7.64E-04	8.28E-03	1.04E-02	2.59E-02
	Single Train	1.02E-02	1.84E-02	1.97E-02	3.41E-02

<sup>a</sup> By using industry-wide component failure data, individual plant performance is not included in the distribution of results.




Figure 3. RHR shutdown cooling mode start-only mission unreliability for class and industry-wide groupings.




Figure 4. RHR shutdown cooling mode 24-hour mission unreliability for class and industry-wide groupings.



## 4. INDUSTRY-WIDE TRENDS

The yearly (FY-98 through FY-13) failure and demand or run time data were obtained from ICES for the RHR system. RHR train maintenance unavailability data for trending are from the same time period, as reported in the ROP and ICES. The component basic event uncertainty was calculated for the RHR system components using the trending methods described in Section 1 and 2 of the Overview and Reference document. These data were loaded into the RHR system fault tree in each SPAR model (see Table 3).

The trend charts show the results of varying component reliability data over time and updating generic, relatively flat prior distributions using data for each year. In addition, the calculated industry-wide system reliability from this update is shown. Section 4 of the Overview and Reference link on the System Studies main web page provides more detailed discussion of the trending methods. In the lower left-hand corner of the trend figures, the regression method is reported.

### 4.1 Low-Pressure Injection Mode

The components that were varied in the RHR (injection mode) model are

- RHR motor-driven pump start, run, and test and maintenance
- RHR heat exchanger heat transfer and test and maintenance
- Suction and Injection valves fail-to-open or close.

Figure 5 shows the trend in the RHR (injection mode) start-only model unreliability. Table 7 shows the data points for Figure 5. There is no statistically significant trend within the industry-wide estimates of RHR (injection mode) system start-only mission on a per fiscal year. Figure 6 shows the trend in the 8-hour mission unreliability. No statistically significant trend within the industry-wide estimate of RHR (injection mode) system unreliability (8-hour mission) on a per fiscal year basis was identified. Table 8 shows the data points for Figure 6.




Figure 5. Trend of RHR (injection mode) system unreliability (start-only model), as a function of fiscal year.




Figure 6. Trend of RHR (injection mode) system unreliability (8-hour model), as a function of fiscal year.

## 4.2 Shutdown Cooling Mode

The components that were varied in the shutdown-cooling mode of the RHR model are:

- RHR motor-driven pump start, run, and test and maintenance.
- RHR heat exchanger heat transfer and test and maintenance.
- Suction and Injection valves fail-to-open or close.

Figure 7 shows the trend in the shutdown-cooling mode RHR start-only model unreliability. Table 9 shows the data points for Figure 7. No statistically significant trends within the industry-wide estimates of the shutdown-cooling mode RHR system start-only mission on a per fiscal year basis were identified. Figure 8 shows the trend in the 24-hour mission unreliability. No statistically significant trend within the industry-wide estimates of RHR system unreliability (24-hour mission) on a per fiscal year basis was identified. Table 10 shows the data points for Figure 8.




Figure 7. Trend of RHR shutdown cooling mode system unreliability (start-only model), as a function of fiscal year.




Figure 8. Trend of RHR shutdown cooling mode system unreliability (24-hour model), as a function of fiscal year.

## 5. BASIC EVENT GROUP IMPORTANCES

The RHR basic event group Fussell-Vesely importances were calculated for each plant using the industry-wide data (1998–2010). These basic event group importances were then averaged across all plants to represent an industry-wide basic event group importance. Table 6 shows the SPAR model RHR importance groups and their descriptions.

*Table 6. RHR model basic event importance group descriptions.*

<b>Group</b>	<b>Description</b>
AC Power	The ac buses and circuit breakers that supply power to the RHR pumps.
CCW	Closed cooling water system. An intermediate cooling system that transfers the heat to the ultimate heat sink.
DC Power	The batteries and battery chargers that supply power to the pump control circuitry.
EPS	RHR dependency on the emergency power system.
HA Start RHR	Human action to start the pumps and re-align any valves.
Heat Sink	The pumps, valves, strainers and other equipment associated with the ultimate heat sink.
Human Action	Other human actions for recovery of equipment.
Injection	The flow path equipment, to direct the shutdown cooling water to the RCS loop.
Instrument Air	Instrument air support to the RHR model.
Min Flow	The minimum flow valves around the RHR heat exchangers. These are used to control the cooldown rate.
Pump Cooling	Cooling provided to the shutdown cooling pumps.
RHR HTX	The first heat exchanger in the system to transfer heat from the RCS to the next level of heat removal.
RHR MDP	The motor-driven pumps that provide the recirculation flow from the RCS loop back to the RCS.
Room Cooling	Cooling provided to the room the shutdown cooling pumps are located in.
Special	Various events used in the models that are not directly associated with the RHR system.
Suction	Valves in the suction section of the shutdown cooling system. These valves are required to change position to redirect the suction to the RCS loop.

### 5.1 Low-Pressure Injection Mode

The industry-wide RHR start-only and 8-hour basic event group importances for low-pressure-injection mode are shown in Figure 9. In both cases, the leading contributors to RHR LPI system unreliability are the RHR motor-driven pumps followed by the injection flow path. For more discussion on the RHR motor-driven pumps and the RHR motor-operated and air-operated valves (MOVs and AOVs), see the component reliability studies at [NRC Reactor Operational Experience Results and Databases](#).

The basic event group importances were also averaged across plants of the same RHR class to represent class basic event group importances. The RHR class-specific start-only and 8-hour basic event group importances are shown in Figure 10 to Figure 18.




Figure 9. RHR (injection mode) industry-wide basic event group importances.




Figure 10. RHR (injection mode) two pump BW basic event group importances.




Figure 11. RHR (injection mode) two pumps CE basic event group importances.




Figure 12. RHR (injection mode) two pumps GE basic event group importances.




Figure 13. RHR (injection mode) two pumps WE basic event group importances.




Figure 14. RHR (injection mode) three pumps BW basic event group importances.






Figure 15. RHR (injection mode) three pumps GE basic event group importances.




Figure 16. RHR (injection mode) three pumps WE basic event group importances.




Figure 17. RHR (injection mode) four pumps CE basic event group importances.




Figure 18. RHR (injection mode) four pumps GE basic event group importances.

## 5.2 Shutdown Cooling Mode

The industry-wide RHR start-only and 24-hour basic event group importances for shutdown cooling mode are shown in Figure 19. In both cases, the leading contributor to RHR system unreliability is the realignment of the RHR suction flowpath followed by random failures of the injection flow path. For more discussion on the RHR MOVs and AOVs, see the MOV and AOV component reliability studies at [NRC Reactor Operational Experience Results and Databases](#).

The basic event group importances were also averaged across plants of the same RHR class to represent class basic event group importances. The RHR class-specific start-only and 24-hour basic event group importances are shown in Figure 20 to Figure 26.




Figure 19. RHR shutdown cooling mode industry-wide basic event group importances.




Figure 20. RHR shutdown cooling mode direct heat sink, multiple suction path basic event group importances.




Figure 21. RHR shutdown cooling mode direct heat sink, single suction path basic event group importances.




Figure 22. RHR shutdown cooling mode indirect heat sink, multiple suction paths basic event group importances.




Figure 23. RHR shutdown cooling mode indirect heat sink, single suction path basic event group importances.




Figure 24. RHR shutdown cooling mode no suction modeled basic event group importances.




Figure 25. RHR shutdown cooling mode single train basic event group importances.




Figure 26. RHR shutdown cooling mode single use SDC system basic event group importances.





## 6. DATA TABLES

*Table 7. Plot data for RHR low-pressure injection mode start-only trend, Figure 5.*

FY/Source	Regression Curve Data Points			Plot Trend Error Bar Points		
	Mean	Lower (5%)	Upper (95%)	Lower (5%)	Upper (95%)	Mean
Industry				7.08E-06	8.57E-04	2.60E-04
1998				1.42E-05	8.74E-04	2.71E-04
1999				1.15E-05	8.64E-04	2.55E-04
2000				1.33E-05	8.71E-04	2.64E-04
2001				1.19E-05	8.67E-04	2.54E-04
2002				7.72E-06	8.50E-04	2.40E-04
2003				1.14E-05	8.64E-04	2.53E-04
2004	2.54E-04	2.37E-04	2.73E-04	1.02E-05	8.61E-04	2.46E-04
2005	2.53E-04	2.38E-04	2.68E-04	1.13E-05	8.61E-04	2.54E-04
2006	2.51E-04	2.39E-04	2.64E-04	9.87E-06	8.59E-04	2.59E-04
2007	2.50E-04	2.39E-04	2.61E-04	1.24E-05	8.66E-04	2.65E-04
2008	2.48E-04	2.39E-04	2.58E-04	8.67E-06	8.56E-04	2.43E-04
2009	2.47E-04	2.37E-04	2.56E-04	7.58E-06	8.52E-04	2.42E-04
2010	2.45E-04	2.35E-04	2.56E-04	9.13E-06	8.55E-04	2.49E-04
2011	2.44E-04	2.32E-04	2.57E-04	6.20E-06	8.50E-04	2.29E-04
2012	2.42E-04	2.28E-04	2.57E-04	5.65E-06	8.48E-04	2.31E-04
2013	2.41E-04	2.25E-04	2.59E-04	7.12E-06	8.59E-04	2.60E-04

Table 8. Plot data for RHR low-pressure injection mode 8-hour trend, Figure 6.

FY/Source	Regression Curve Data Points			Plot Trend Error Bar Points		
	Mean	Lower (5%)	Upper (95%)	Lower (5%)	Upper (95%)	Mean
Industry				1.07E-05	8.96E-04	3.07E-04
1998				1.73E-05	9.14E-04	3.29E-04
1999				1.45E-05	8.98E-04	3.13E-04
2000				1.70E-05	9.14E-04	3.26E-04
2001				1.42E-05	9.00E-04	3.11E-04
2002				1.22E-05	8.83E-04	3.02E-04
2003				1.49E-05	9.08E-04	3.19E-04
2004	3.13E-04	2.96E-04	3.31E-04	1.30E-05	8.94E-04	3.06E-04
2005	3.12E-04	2.97E-04	3.27E-04	1.46E-05	8.91E-04	3.12E-04
2006	3.10E-04	2.98E-04	3.23E-04	1.34E-05	8.89E-04	3.16E-04
2007	3.09E-04	2.98E-04	3.19E-04	1.66E-05	9.09E-04	3.28E-04
2008	3.07E-04	2.98E-04	3.17E-04	1.21E-05	8.87E-04	3.02E-04
2009	3.06E-04	2.96E-04	3.15E-04	1.11E-05	8.80E-04	2.99E-04
2010	3.04E-04	2.94E-04	3.15E-04	1.23E-05	8.82E-04	3.05E-04
2011	3.03E-04	2.91E-04	3.16E-04	8.99E-06	8.76E-04	2.88E-04
2012	3.02E-04	2.87E-04	3.17E-04	9.83E-06	8.82E-04	2.94E-04
2013	3.00E-04	2.84E-04	3.18E-04	1.08E-05	9.00E-04	3.18E-04

Table 9. Plot data for RHR shutdown cooling mode start-only trend, Figure 7.

FY/Source	Regression Curve Data Points			Plot Trend Error Bar Points		
	Mean	Lower (5%)	Upper (95%)	Lower (5%)	Upper (95%)	Mean
Industry				1.80E-04	1.39E-02	4.39E-03
1998				2.32E-04	1.57E-02	5.22E-03
1999				1.97E-04	1.39E-02	4.41E-03
2000				2.09E-04	1.46E-02	4.71E-03
2001				1.82E-04	1.33E-02	4.02E-03
2002				1.81E-04	1.31E-02	4.20E-03
2003				1.88E-04	1.34E-02	4.11E-03
2004	4.69E-03	3.74E-03	5.89E-03	1.73E-04	1.27E-02	3.84E-03
2005	4.61E-03	3.80E-03	5.58E-03	2.00E-04	1.41E-02	4.57E-03
2006	4.52E-03	3.84E-03	5.31E-03	2.27E-04	1.57E-02	5.39E-03
2007	4.43E-03	3.86E-03	5.09E-03	2.31E-04	1.58E-02	5.35E-03
2008	4.35E-03	3.84E-03	4.92E-03	1.79E-04	1.29E-02	4.06E-03
2009	4.27E-03	3.77E-03	4.83E-03	1.86E-04	1.33E-02	4.30E-03
2010	4.19E-03	3.65E-03	4.81E-03	2.01E-04	1.42E-02	4.69E-03
2011	4.11E-03	3.50E-03	4.83E-03	1.48E-04	1.14E-02	3.34E-03
2012	4.03E-03	3.33E-03	4.89E-03	1.57E-04	1.18E-02	3.61E-03
2013	3.96E-03	3.15E-03	4.96E-03	1.87E-04	1.38E-02	4.41E-03

Table 10. Plot data for RHR shutdown cooling mode 24-hour trend, Figure 8.

FY/Source	Regression Curve Data Points			Plot Trend Error Bar Points		
	Mean	Lower (5%)	Upper (95%)	Lower (5%)	Upper (95%)	Mean
Industry				2.23E-04	1.44E-02	4.57E-03
1998				2.73E-04	1.62E-02	5.39E-03
1999				2.34E-04	1.44E-02	4.55E-03
2000				2.57E-04	1.54E-02	4.90E-03
2001				2.19E-04	1.37E-02	4.16E-03
2002				2.33E-04	1.43E-02	4.44E-03
2003				2.52E-04	1.50E-02	4.43E-03
2004	4.88E-03	3.95E-03	6.04E-03	2.20E-04	1.36E-02	4.04E-03
2005	4.80E-03	4.00E-03	5.74E-03	2.43E-04	1.48E-02	4.74E-03
2006	4.71E-03	4.05E-03	5.48E-03	2.68E-04	1.62E-02	5.55E-03
2007	4.63E-03	4.07E-03	5.27E-03	2.88E-04	1.68E-02	5.60E-03
2008	4.55E-03	4.05E-03	5.11E-03	2.23E-04	1.38E-02	4.27E-03
2009	4.47E-03	3.98E-03	5.02E-03	2.25E-04	1.41E-02	4.48E-03
2010	4.39E-03	3.86E-03	4.99E-03	2.39E-04	1.47E-02	4.84E-03
2011	4.31E-03	3.70E-03	5.02E-03	1.91E-04	1.23E-02	3.54E-03
2012	4.24E-03	3.54E-03	5.07E-03	2.11E-04	1.31E-02	3.88E-03
2013	4.16E-03	3.36E-03	5.15E-03	2.24E-04	1.44E-02	4.58E-03

Table 11. Basic event reliability trending data.

Failure Mode	Component <sup>a</sup>	Year	Number of Failures	Demands/Run Hours	Bayesian Update			Distribution
					Mean	Post A	Post B	
FTOC	AOV	1998	1	750	1.10E-03	2.1	1917.2	Beta
FTOC	AOV	1999	1	913	1.01E-03	2.1	2080.2	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2000	0	760	5.77E-04	1.1	1927.7	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2001	0	842	5.53E-04	1.1	2010.4	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2002	1	870	1.04E-03	2.1	2036.5	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2003	1	855	1.04E-03	2.1	2021.6	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2004	0	806	5.63E-04	1.1	1973.6	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2005	0	720	5.89E-04	1.1	1887.7	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2006	2	596	1.76E-03	3.1	1761.7	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2007	1	617	1.18E-03	2.1	1783.6	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2008	0	610	6.25E-04	1.1	1777.6	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2009	1	607	1.19E-03	2.1	1774.2	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2010	1	639	1.17E-03	2.1	1806.1	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2011	0	622	6.21E-04	1.1	1790.2	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2012	0	604	6.27E-04	1.1	1772.5	Beta
FTOC	AOV	2013	0	617	6.23E-04	1.1	1784.7	Beta
FTOC	MOV	1998	17	11343	1.41E-03	19.0	13449.0	Beta
FTOC	MOV	1999	14	13552	1.02E-03	16.0	15661.2	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2000	16	13386	1.16E-03	18.0	15493.1	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2001	10	13636	7.64E-04	12.0	15749.5	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2002	12	13827	8.81E-04	14.0	15937.9	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2003	10	13560	7.68E-04	12.0	15672.5	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2004	8	12702	6.78E-04	10.0	14816.8	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2005	14	12215	1.12E-03	16.0	14323.9	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2006	16	9924	1.50E-03	18.0	12031.0	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2007	16	9851	1.51E-03	18.0	11957.7	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2008	8	9948	8.32E-04	10.0	12062.7	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2009	9	9731	9.32E-04	11.0	11844.9	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2010	14	10021	1.32E-03	16.0	12130.2	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2011	4	10014	4.98E-04	6.0	12133.2	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2012	7	9988	7.47E-04	9.0	12104.0	Beta
FTOC	MOV	2013	7	10030	7.44E-04	9.0	12146.4	Beta
FTOP	AOV	1998	0	1208880	2.05E-07	1.4	6927880.0	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	1999	0	1208880	2.05E-07	1.4	6927880.0	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2000	0	1208880	2.05E-07	1.4	6927880.0	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2001	0	1208880	2.05E-07	1.4	6927880.0	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2002	0	1208880	2.05E-07	1.4	6927880.0	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2003	0	1208880	2.05E-07	1.4	6927880.0	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2004	0	1208880	2.05E-07	1.4	6927880.0	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2005	0	1208880	2.05E-07	1.4	6927880.0	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2006	0	1208880	2.05E-07	1.4	6927880.0	Gamma

Table 11. (continued).

Failure Mode	Component <sup>a</sup>	Year	Number of Failures	Demands/Run Hours	Bayesian Update			Distribution
					Mean	Post A	Post B	
FTOP	AOV	2007	0	1208880	2.05E-07	1.4	6927880.0	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2008	0	1208880	2.05E-07	1.4	6927880.0	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2009	0	1208880	2.05E-07	1.4	6927880.0	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2010	0	1208880	2.05E-07	1.4	6927880.0	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2011	0	1208880	2.05E-07	1.4	6927880.0	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2012	0	1208880	2.05E-07	1.4	6927880.0	Gamma
FTOP	AOV	2013	0	1208880	2.05E-07	1.4	6927880.0	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	1998	1	15697920	6.51E-08	2.5	37747920.0	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	1999	3	15838080	1.18E-07	4.5	37888080.0	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2000	6	15838080	1.97E-07	7.5	37888080.0	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2001	1	15838080	6.49E-08	2.5	37888080.0	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2002	0	15838080	3.85E-08	1.5	37888080.0	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2003	2	15873120	9.12E-08	3.5	37923120.0	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2004	0	15846840	3.85E-08	1.5	37896840.0	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2005	0	15846840	3.85E-08	1.5	37896840.0	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2006	1	15846840	6.49E-08	2.5	37896840.0	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2007	1	15838080	6.49E-08	2.5	37888080.0	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2008	0	15829320	3.85E-08	1.5	37879320.0	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2009	0	15829320	3.85E-08	1.5	37879320.0	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2010	1	15829320	6.49E-08	2.5	37879320.0	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2011	0	16065840	3.83E-08	1.5	38115840.0	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2012	1	15908160	6.48E-08	2.5	37958160.0	Gamma
FTOP	MOV	2013	2	15908160	9.11E-08	3.5	37958160.0	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	1998	0	4535	9.42E-05	1.8	19325.5	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	1999	1	4690	1.45E-04	2.8	19480.0	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2000	2	4706	1.96E-04	3.8	19495.8	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2001	0	4560	9.41E-05	1.8	19350.0	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2002	1	4763	1.44E-04	2.8	19552.8	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2003	0	5180	9.11E-05	1.8	19969.5	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2004	0	5085	9.16E-05	1.8	19874.8	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2005	0	5418	9.01E-05	1.8	20207.6	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2006	0	4954	9.22E-05	1.8	19743.9	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2007	0	5260	9.08E-05	1.8	20050.4	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2008	0	5039	9.18E-05	1.8	19829.4	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2009	0	5123	9.14E-05	1.8	19912.6	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2010	0	5283	9.07E-05	1.8	20072.8	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2011	0	4993	9.20E-05	1.8	19782.8	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2012	1	5157	1.41E-04	2.8	19946.8	Gamma
FTR<1H	MDP	2013	1	5291	1.40E-04	2.8	20081.4	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	1998	1	101955	1.01E-05	1.8	176964.7	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	1999	0	80967	5.01E-06	0.8	155977.4	Gamma

Table 11. (continued).

Failure Mode	Component <sup>a</sup>	Year	Number of Failures	Demands/Run Hours	Bayesian Update			Distribution
					Mean	Post A	Post B	
FTR>1H	MDP	2000	1	54456	1.38E-05	1.8	129465.8	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2001	0	64709	5.59E-06	0.8	139718.5	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2002	3	53254	2.95E-05	3.8	128264.3	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2003	6	62262	4.94E-05	6.8	137272.0	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2004	2	46797	2.28E-05	2.8	121807.1	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2005	1	52924	1.39E-05	1.8	127934.4	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2006	0	43411	6.60E-06	0.8	118421.5	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2007	3	47888	3.08E-05	3.8	122897.9	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2008	2	47206	2.28E-05	2.8	122215.9	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2009	1	43778	1.50E-05	1.8	118788.1	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2010	0	47940	6.35E-06	0.8	122949.6	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2011	2	47702	2.27E-05	2.8	122711.6	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2012	4	53042	3.73E-05	4.8	128051.8	Gamma
FTR>1H	MDP	2013	2	52074	2.19E-05	2.8	127083.6	Gamma
FTS	MDP	1998	6	4535	1.21E-03	7.9	6583.5	Beta
FTS	MDP	1999	5	4690	1.03E-03	6.9	6739.0	Beta
FTS	MDP	2000	6	4706	1.18E-03	7.9	6753.8	Beta
FTS	MDP	2001	6	4560	1.20E-03	7.9	6608.0	Beta
FTS	MDP	2002	2	4763	5.79E-04	3.9	6814.8	Beta
FTS	MDP	2003	6	5180	1.10E-03	7.9	7227.5	Beta
FTS	MDP	2004	5	5085	9.73E-04	6.9	7133.8	Beta
FTS	MDP	2005	5	5418	9.30E-04	6.9	7466.6	Beta
FTS	MDP	2006	3	4954	7.06E-04	4.9	7004.9	Beta
FTS	MDP	2007	5	5260	9.50E-04	6.9	7309.4	Beta
FTS	MDP	2008	3	5039	6.97E-04	4.9	7090.4	Beta
FTS	MDP	2009	2	5123	5.50E-04	3.9	7174.6	Beta
FTS	MDP	2010	3	5283	6.74E-04	4.9	7333.8	Beta
FTS	MDP	2011	2	4993	5.60E-04	3.9	7044.8	Beta
FTS	MDP	2012	1	5157	4.09E-04	2.9	7209.8	Beta
FTS	MDP	2013	3	5291	6.73E-04	4.9	7342.4	Beta
LOHT	HTX	1998	0	0	5.23E-07	16.5	31564650.0	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	1999	0	0	5.23E-07	16.5	31564650.0	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2000	0	0	5.23E-07	16.5	31564650.0	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2001	2	0	5.86E-07	18.5	31564650.0	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2002	0	0	5.23E-07	16.5	31564650.0	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2003	0	0	5.23E-07	16.5	31564650.0	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2004	0	0	5.23E-07	16.5	31564650.0	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2005	0	0	5.23E-07	16.5	31564650.0	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2006	0	0	5.23E-07	16.5	31564650.0	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2007	0	0	5.23E-07	16.5	31564650.0	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2008	0	0	5.23E-07	16.5	31564650.0	Gamma

Table 11. (continued).

Failure Mode	Component <sup>a</sup>	Year	Number of Failures	Demands/Run Hours	Bayesian Update			Distribution
					Mean	Post A	Post B	
LOHT	HTX	2009	0	0	5.23E-07	16.5	31564650.0	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2010	0	0	5.23E-07	16.5	31564650.0	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2011	0	0	5.23E-07	16.5	31564650.0	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2012	0	0	5.23E-07	16.5	31564650.0	Gamma
LOHT	HTX	2013	0	0	5.23E-07	16.5	31564650.0	Gamma
SO	AOV	1998	0	1208880	1.06E-07	0.7	6419880.0	Gamma
SO	AOV	1999	0	1208880	1.06E-07	0.7	6419880.0	Gamma
SO	AOV	2000	0.0	1208880.0	1.06E-07	0.7	6419880.0	Gamma
SO	AOV	2001	0.0	1208880.0	1.06E-07	0.7	6419880.0	Gamma
SO	AOV	2002	0.0	1208880.0	1.06E-07	0.7	6419880.0	Gamma
SO	AOV	2003	0.0	1208880.0	1.06E-07	0.7	6419880.0	Gamma
SO	AOV	2004	0.0	1208880.0	1.06E-07	0.7	6419880.0	Gamma
SO	AOV	2005	0.0	1208880.0	1.06E-07	0.7	6419880.0	Gamma
SO	AOV	2006	0.0	1208880.0	1.06E-07	0.7	6419880.0	Gamma
SO	AOV	2007	0.0	1208880.0	1.06E-07	0.7	6419880.0	Gamma
SO	AOV	2008	1.0	1208880.0	2.62E-07	1.7	6419880.0	Gamma
SO	AOV	2009	0.0	1208880.0	1.06E-07	0.7	6419880.0	Gamma
SO	AOV	2010	0.0	1208880.0	1.06E-07	0.7	6419880.0	Gamma
SO	AOV	2011	0.0	1208880.0	1.06E-07	0.7	6419880.0	Gamma
SO	AOV	2012	0.0	1208880.0	1.06E-07	0.7	6419880.0	Gamma
SO	AOV	2013	1.0	1208880.0	2.62E-07	1.7	6419880.0	Gamma
SO	MOV	1998	3.0	15697920.0	1.10E-07	3.6	32537920.0	Gamma
SO	MOV	1999	0.0	15838080.0	1.75E-08	0.6	32678080.0	Gamma
SO	MOV	2000	2.0	15838080.0	7.87E-08	2.6	32678080.0	Gamma
SO	MOV	2001	0.0	15838080.0	1.75E-08	0.6	32678080.0	Gamma
SO	MOV	2002	0.0	15838080.0	1.75E-08	0.6	32678080.0	Gamma
SO	MOV	2003	1.0	15873120.0	4.80E-08	1.6	32713120.0	Gamma
SO	MOV	2004	0.0	15846840.0	1.74E-08	0.6	32686840.0	Gamma
SO	MOV	2005	0.0	15846840.0	1.74E-08	0.6	32686840.0	Gamma
SO	MOV	2006	0.0	15846840.0	1.74E-08	0.6	32686840.0	Gamma
SO	MOV	2007	1.0	15838080.0	4.81E-08	1.6	32678080.0	Gamma
SO	MOV	2008	0.0	15829320.0	1.75E-08	0.6	32669320.0	Gamma
SO	MOV	2009	0.0	15829320.0	1.75E-08	0.6	32669320.0	Gamma
SO	MOV	2010	0.0	15829320.0	1.75E-08	0.6	32669320.0	Gamma
SO	MOV	2011	0.0	16065840.0	1.73E-08	0.6	32905840.0	Gamma



Table 11. (continued).

Failure Mode	Component <sup>a</sup>	Year	Number of Failures	Demands/Run Hours	Bayesian Update			Distribution
					Mean	Post A	Post B	
SO	MOV	2012	0.0	15908160.0	1.74E-08	0.6	32748160.0	Gamma
SO	MOV	2013	1.0	15908160.0	4.80E-08	1.6	32748160.0	Gamma

- a. AOV = air-operated valve
- HTX = heat exchanger
- LOHT = loss of heat transfer
- MDP = motor-driven pump
- MOV = motor-operated valve.

Table 12. Basic event UA trending data.

Failure Mode	Component	Year	UA Hours	Critical Hours	Bayesian Update			
					Mean	Post A	Post B	Distribution
UA	HDR	2002	46.2	76298.2	6.50E-04	0.3	480.8	Beta
UA	HDR	2003	82.5	104108.4	5.42E-04	0.4	721.6	Beta
UA	HDR	2004	97.3	135846.3	6.22E-04	0.2	384.1	Beta
UA	HDR	2005	57.3	127718.0	3.90E-04	0.6	1656.7	Beta
UA	HDR	2006	61.7	128165.9	4.63E-04	0.2	450.8	Beta
UA	HDR	2007	87.4	132782.9	5.22E-04	0.4	738.8	Beta
UA	HDR	2008	72.5	131153.1	4.88E-04	0.3	592.6	Beta
UA	HDR	2009	83.7	130048.2	6.13E-04	0.2	279.6	Beta
UA	HDR	2010	50.7	121815.0	3.35E-04	0.4	1067.4	Beta
UA	HDR	2011	69.6	118159.5	4.94E-04	0.2	496.0	Beta
UA	HDR	2012	148.7	117699.2	1.15E-03	0.2	175.3	Beta
UA	HDR	2013	157.5	119651.4	1.26E-03	0.2	148.2	Beta
UA	HTX	2002	25.3	50600.2	4.87E-04	0.5	995.0	Beta
UA	HTX	2003	76.8	64793.2	1.17E-03	0.6	479.4	Beta
UA	HTX	2004	121.9	68060.4	1.78E-03	0.9	493.4	Beta
UA	HTX	2005	89.1	63663.9	1.32E-03	0.6	462.4	Beta
UA	HTX	2006	138.8	63549.6	2.13E-03	1.6	771.7	Beta
UA	HTX	2007	131.9	66979.1	1.98E-03	1.2	627.7	Beta
UA	HTX	2008	183.6	65370.2	2.73E-03	0.7	247.5	Beta
UA	HTX	2009	175.2	65541.8	2.60E-03	0.8	323.4	Beta
UA	HTX	2010	124.6	66029.0	1.84E-03	0.7	400.5	Beta
UA	HTX	2011	86.6	64210.6	1.29E-03	1.3	1014.8	Beta
UA	HTX	2012	153.1	59810.5	2.37E-03	0.7	313.3	Beta
UA	HTX	2013	265.5	62692.4	3.90E-03	0.7	184.4	Beta
UA	MDP	2002	6757.0	1181635.0	5.77E-03	1.4	248.2	Beta
UA	MDP	2003	9903.7	1694959.0	5.80E-03	1.5	253.4	Beta
UA	MDP	2004	8834.1	1823048.0	4.78E-03	1.7	347.6	Beta
UA	MDP	2005	9412.6	1786052.0	5.13E-03	2.0	388.7	Beta
UA	MDP	2006	8511.1	1823976.0	4.54E-03	1.5	321.4	Beta
UA	MDP	2007	8779.2	1812695.0	4.67E-03	1.4	296.5	Beta
UA	MDP	2008	9328.0	1816209.0	5.11E-03	2.1	407.3	Beta
UA	MDP	2009	10380.7	1816116.0	5.45E-03	1.8	333.5	Beta
UA	MDP	2010	10181.8	1788704.0	5.48E-03	1.9	345.3	Beta
UA	MDP	2011	9126.3	1756809.0	5.09E-03	1.9	362.9	Beta
UA	MDP	2012	9853.3	1733064.0	5.33E-03	1.6	298.7	Beta
UA	MDP	2013	9729.0	1702603.0	5.24E-03	1.4	270.5	Beta

a. HDR = header.

*Table 13. Failure mode acronyms.*

<b>Failure Mode</b>	<b>Failure Mode Description</b>
FTOC	Fail to open/close
FTOP	Fail to operate
FTR	Fail to run
FTR>1H	Fail to run more than one hour (standby)
FTR<1H	Fail to run less than one hour
FTS	Fail to start
LOHT	Loss of heat transfer
SO	Spurious operation
UA	Unavailability (maintenance or state of another component)



## 7. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

Being a multipurpose system, RHR provides many important functional configurations generally known as modes of operation. The different modes of RHR operation can include

- Low Pressure Coolant/Safety Injection
- Shutdown Cooling
- Suppression Pool Cooling (SPC) or Containment Sump Recirculation
- Containment Spray
- Fuel Pool Cooling.

The fundamental differences between plants can be summarized as some plants have dedicated shutdown-cooling systems, plants either use an intermediate closed cooling system or use a direct heat sink source of cooling to the RHR heat exchangers, plants have differing number of pumps (from 2 to 4), and the loop suction valve configuration is a single path with two valves or there are multiple paths. The RHR configurations at each plant are shown in Table 14. Figure 27 shows a generic depiction of a RHR system.

### 7.1 Low Pressure Injection Mode

The low-pressure injection (LPI) mode of the RHR system is primarily designed to mitigate the loss of coolant accidents (large and medium). During the injection phase of operation following a large LOCA, the RHR operates as an open-loop system and provides rapid injection of coolant to the primary system to ensure reactor shutdown and adequate core cooling. LPI operation is initiated automatically.

Considering the above process, LPI operation requires

- Opening discharge valves (AOV or MOV)
- Starting and running one or more RHR pumps

Either offsite or onsite emergency power may be used to operate RHR pumps and valves.

### 7.2 Shutdown Cooling Mode

For the SDC mode of the RHR system, the flow path is different from LPI and SPC or containment sump recirculation in that the suction source is the reactor via the reactor recirculation line or hot leg. From the recirculation line or the hot legs, water flows through two motor-operated isolation valves in series, the first being located inside containment while the second is outside containment. This is then followed by individual suction isolation valves for each train, then to the suction of each pump.

The RHR system in SDC mode removes fission product decay heat from the reactor core and sensible heat from RCS components during system cooldowns and at cold shutdown. The design pressure limits for the RHR system are lower than the RCS, so the system is isolated from the RCS during power operation. During RCS cooldowns to cold shutdown, the RHR system remains isolated until RCS temperature and pressure are below interlock setpoints.

SDC is not automatic. The RHR system is cold relative to the RCS, so RHR components must undergo a heatup process prior to use. RHR heat transfer (RCS cooldown) is controlled by heat exchanger cooling water valve adjustment.

Considering the above process, SDC operation requires

- Opening suction and discharge valves (AOV or MOV)

- Starting and running one or more RHR pumps
- Establishing cooling water flow to the RHR heat exchanger
- Isolating the heat exchanger bypass
- Flow control through minimum flow valves
- Flow control of cooling water.

Either offsite or onsite emergency power may be used to operate RHR pumps and valves.

Two basic types of heat sinks are used at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The first is referred to here as a direct heat sink and the second is referred to here as an intermediate heat sink:

**Direct Heat Sink**—The direct heat sink generally uses a standby service water system to provide the heat sink for shutdown cooling. In some plants this is a dedicated residual heat removal service water system; in other plants, the emergency service water system is used. Either way, since the system is in standby, the pumps must be started to provide cooling.

**Indirect Heat Sink**—The plants with an indirect heat sink use a closed cooling water system such as the reactor building closed cooling water system as the first heat removal provider. The heat is ultimately removed by a normally running service water system. The main purpose of the intermediate cooling water system is to provide a barrier to the release of radioactive liquid to the environment.

# Residual Heat Removal System




Figure 27. Generic depiction of the RHR system.

Table 14. Listing of the RHR design classes.<sup>a</sup>

Plant	Vendor	LPI Tree	SDC Tree <sup>b</sup>	BWR Containment	BWR Design	PWR Loops	Shutdown Cooling Class	Injection Class
Arkansas 1	BW	LPI	DHR			2	Direct-Single	2 pumps; BW
Arkansas 2	CE	LPI	SDC			2	Direct-Single	2 pumps; CE
Beaver Valley 1	WE	LPI	RHR			3	Single Use	2 pumps; WE
Beaver Valley 2	WE	LPI	RHR			3	Single Use	2 pumps; WE
Braidwood 1	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Braidwood 2	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Browns Ferry 1	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Browns Ferry 2	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Browns Ferry 3	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Brunswick 1	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I(C)	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Brunswick 2	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I(C)	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Byron 1	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Byron 2	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Callaway	WE	LPI	RHR		SNUPPS	4	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Calvert Cliffs 1	CE	LPI	SDC			2	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; CE
Calvert Cliffs 2	CE	LPI	SDC			2	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; CE
Catawba 1	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Catawba 2	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Clinton 1	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK III(C)	B-CLASS 6		Direct-Single	2 pumps; GE
Columbia 2	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK II	B-CLASS 5		Direct-Single	2 pumps; GE
Comanche Peak 1	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Comanche Peak 2	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Cook 1	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Cook 2	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Cooper	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Crystal River 3	BW	LPI	DHR			2	Direct-Single	2 pumps; BW
Davis-Besse	BW	LPI	DHR			2	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; BW
Diablo Canyon 1	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Diablo Canyon 2	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Dresden 2	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 3		Single Use	3 pumps; GE
Dresden 3	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 3		Single Use	3 pumps; GE
Duane Arnold	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Farley 1	WE	LPI	RHR			3	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Farley 2	WE	LPI	RHR			3	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Fermi 2	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
FitzPatrick	GE	LCI	SPC	MARK I	B-CLASS 4		No suction modeled	4 pumps; GE
Fort Calhoun	CE	LPI	SDC			2	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; CE
Ginna	WE	LPI	RHR			2	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Grand Gulf	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK III(C)	B-CLASS 6		Direct-Single	2 pumps; GE
Harris	WE	LPI	RHR			3	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Hatch 1	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Hatch 2	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Hope Creek	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	2 pumps; GE
Indian Point 2	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE



Table 14. (continued).

Plant	Vendor	LPI Tree	SDC Tree <sup>b</sup>	BWR Containment	BWR Design	PWR Loops	Shutdown Cooling Class	Injection Class
Indian Point 3	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Kewaunee	WE	LPI	RHR			2	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
La Salle 1	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK II(C)	B-CLASS 5		Direct-Single	2 pumps; GE
La Salle 2	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK II(C)	B-CLASS 5		Direct-Single	2 pumps; GE
Limerick 1	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK II(C)	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Limerick 2	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK II(C)	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
McGuire 1	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
McGuire 2	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Millstone 2	CE	LPI	SDC			2	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; CE
Millstone 3	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Monticello	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 3		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Nine Mile Pt. 1	GE	LCS	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 2		Single Use	3 pumps; GE
Nine Mile Pt. 2	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK II(C)	B-CLASS 5		Direct-Single	2 pumps; GE
North Anna 1	WE	LPI	RHR			3	Single Use	2 pumps; WE
North Anna 2	WE	LPI	RHR			3	Single Use	2 pumps; WE
Oconee 1	BW	LPI	DHR			2	Indirect-Single	3 pumps; BW
Oconee 2	BW	LPI	DHR			2	Indirect-Single	3 pumps; BW
Oconee 3	BW	LPI	DHR			2	Indirect-Single	3 pumps; BW
Oyster Creek	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 2		Single Use	3 pumps; GE
Palisades	CE	LPI	SDC			2	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; CE
Palo Verde 1	CE	LPI	SDC		SYSTEM 80	2	Direct-Multiple	4 pumps; CE
Palo Verde 2	CE	LPI	SDC		SYSTEM 80	2	Direct-Multiple	4 pumps; CE
Palo Verde 3	CE	LPI	SDC		SYSTEM 80	2	Direct-Multiple	4 pumps; CE
Peach Bottom 2	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Peach Bottom 3	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Perry	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK III	B-CLASS 6		Indirect-Single	2 pumps; GE
Pilgrim	GE	LCI	SPC	MARK I	B-CLASS 3		No suction modeled	4 pumps; GE
Point Beach 1	WE	LPI	RHR			2	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Point Beach 2	WE	LPI	RHR			2	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Prairie Island 1	WE	LPI	RHR			2	Direct-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Prairie Island 2	WE	LPI	RHR			2	Direct-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Quad Cities 1	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 3		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Quad Cities 2	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 3		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
River Bend	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK III	B-CLASS 6		Direct-Single	2 pumps; GE
Robinson 2	WE	LPI	RHR			3	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Salem 1	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Salem 2	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
San Onofre 2	CE	LPI	SDC			2	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; CE
San Onofre 3	CE	LPI	SDC			2	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; CE
Seabrook	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Sequoyah 1	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Sequoyah 2	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
South Texas 1	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Multiple	3 pumps; WE
South Texas 2	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Multiple	3 pumps; WE
St. Lucie 1	CE	LPI	SDC			2	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; CE

Table 14. (continued).

Plant	Vendor	LPI Tree	SDC Tree <sup>b</sup>	BWR Containment	BWR Design	PWR Loops	Shutdown Cooling Class	Injection Class
St. Lucie 2	CE	LPI	SDC		2HL/4CL	2	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; CE
Summer	WE	LPI	RHR			3	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Surry 1	WE	LPI	RHR			3	Single Use	2 pumps; WE
Surry 2	WE	LPI	RHR			3	Single Use	2 pumps; WE
Susquehanna 1	GE	LCI	SPC	MARK II(C)	B-CLASS 4		No suction modeled	4 pumps; GE
Susquehanna 2	GE	LCI	SPC	MARK II(C)	B-CLASS 4		No suction modeled	4 pumps; GE
Three Mile Isl 1	BW	LPI	DHR			2	Single Train	2 pumps; BW
Turkey Point 3	WE	LPI	RHR			3	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Turkey Point 4	WE	LPI	RHR			3	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Vermont Yankee	GE	LCI	SDC	MARK I	B-CLASS 4		Direct-Single	4 pumps; GE
Vogtle 1	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Vogtle 2	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE
Waterford 3	CE	LPI	SDC		2HL/4CL	2	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; CE
Watts Bar 1	WE	LPI	RHR			4	Indirect-Single	2 pumps; WE
Wolf Creek	WE	LPI	RHR		SNUPPS	4	Indirect-Multiple	2 pumps; WE

a. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, *Overview and Comparison of U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants*, NUREG/CR-5640, SAIC-89/1541, September 1990.

b. DHR = decay heat removal.

## 8. REFERENCES

1. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, *Component Reliability Data Sheets Update 2010*, January 2012, <http://nrcoe.inl.gov/resultsdb/publicdocs/AvgPerf/ComponentReliabilityDataSheets2010.pdf>
2. S.A. Eide et al., *Industry-Average Performance for Components and Initiating Events at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants*, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-6928, February 2007.